The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita by Levin, Nickolai G.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 4 Article 11 
2005 
The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita 
Nickolai G. Levin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nickolai G. Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1627 (2005). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss4/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita 
Cover Page Footnote 
Associate, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP. The views expressed in this Article are only the author's and in 
no way represents the views of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP. I am very much indebted to the helpful 
comments of Bruce Ackerman, Morris Sheppard Arnold, Joseph Baker, Michael Carrier, Brad Daniels, 
David Fontana, Adam Hickey, Chetan Gulati, Emil Kleinhaus, Alvin Klevorick, Robert Kry, Thomas Morgan, 
Laura Sigman, Michael Yaeger, and all the participants at the Levy Faculty Workship at George Mason 
University. I also thank Angel Keane for all her assistance. All mistakes, of course, are my own. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss4/11 
THE NOMOS AND NARRATIVE OF
MATSUSHITA
Nickolai G. Levin*
INTRO D U CTIO N ..................................................................................... 1628
I. BACKGROUND ANTITRUST SUMMARY JUDGMENT
E LEM ENTS .................................................................................. 1635
A. Circumstantial Evidence in Section 1 Cases .................... 1636
B. The Six Major Antitrust Summary Judgment Cases
(and M onsanto) ................................................................... 1637
II. INTERPRETING MATSUSHITA ................................................... 1646
A. The Three Readings of Matsushita ................................... 1646
1. U niversal A pplicability ................................................ 1646
2. Im plausibility ................................................................. 1647
3. Deterring Procompetitive Conduct ............................ 1649
B. The Three Considerations of Matsushita ......................... 1650
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW NOMOS AND THE CONSUMER
W ELFARE NARRATIVE ............................................................. 1654
A. The Original Nomos and Narrative .................................. 1654
B. The Conscious Parallelism Nomos ................................... 1659
1. Theatre Enterprises and Its Antecedents .................... 1660
2. The Change in Theatre Enterprises' Generally
A ccepted M eaning ........................................................ 1664
a. The Two Decades Before Theatre Enterprises:
The Inevitable Perniciousness of Oligopolies ..... 1664
b. The Two Decades After Theatre Enterprises:
The Expansion of Structuralism and Increased
Inevitability Concerns Within the Mainstream;
Some Challenges from Chicago Scholars ............. 1672
c. The Mid-1970s to Today: The Increasing
Acceptance of the Plus-Factor Requirement ...... 1676
* Associate, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP. The views expressed in this Article
are only the author's and in no way represents the views of Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw LLP. I am very much indebted to the helpful comments of Bruce Ackerman,
Morris Sheppard Arnold, Joseph Baker, Michael Carrier, Brad Daniels, David
Fontana, Adam Hickey, Chetan Gulati, Emil Kleinhaus, Alvin Klevorick, Robert
Kry, Thomas Morgan, Laura Sigman, Michael Yaeger, and all the participants at the
Levy Faculty Workshop at George Mason University. I also thank Angel Keane for
all her assistance. All mistakes, of course, are my own.
1627
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
i. Venzie and Its Immediate Postcursors... 1677
ii. Monsanto and Matsushita's Influence
on Conscious Parallelism Cases .............. 1681
C. The Consumer Welfare Narrative .................................... 1684
1. The Narrowing of Liability Rules Due to Consumer
W elfare Concerns ......................................................... 1685
2. The Consequent Ramifications for Evidentiary
Rules, Particularly Summary Judgment ..................... 1688
D. The Interaction of the Conscious Parallelism Nomos
and the Consumer Welfare Narrative .............................. 1692
IV. THE THREE CONSIDERATIONS OF MATSUSHITA .................. 1694
A . Im plausibility ...................................................................... 1695
1. W ithin the D octrine ...................................................... 1695
2. The Legitimacy of Its Consideration .......................... 1696
B . D eterrence ........................................................................... 1697
1. W ithin the D octrine ...................................................... 1697
2. The Legitimacy of Its Consideration .......................... 1697
C . Substantive Law .................................................................. 1700
1. W ithin the D octrine ...................................................... 1700
2. The Legitimacy of Its Consideration .......................... 1701
V. OLIGOPOLY PARALLEL PRICING ............................................ 1701
VI. COMPARISON TO POSNER ........................................................ 1706
C O N C LU SIO N ......................................................................................... 1709
INTRODUCTION
Around twenty-one years ago, Robert Cover left an indelible mark
on legal scholarship with his epic tale of world formation and
development, Nomos and Narrative.' He posited the idea that our
culture consists of a multitude of insular communities (nomoi), each
of whose experiences is guided by those texts and events (narratives)
that give its legal precepts normative meaning, thereby connecting
each community's vision of reality to its ideal. Occasions arose,
however, where different communities' visions of the ideal could not
be contained within each community alone and thus came into
conflict.2  Resolution entailed reconciliation of the competing
narratives and ideals in a manner that respected the insularity of each
nomos as much as possible but, where need be, recognized that one
vision was normatively better than another and let it prevail.'
1. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
2. See, e.g., id. at 34.
3. E.g., id. at 13 n.35 ("The problem of 'world maintenance' is a problem of the
coexistence of different worlds and a problem of regulating the splitting of worlds.");
id. at 13 & n.36 (describing the "coercive constraints imposed on the autonomous
realization of normative meanings").
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Cover was specifically concerned with the civil rights movement's
recent redemptive attempts to impose its narrative of racial equality
on the various religious nomoi throughout the United States. He
questioned the imposition of mainstream norms of equality on
individuals whose conscience, guided by particular religious
convictions, indicated otherwise.4 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bob Jones University v. United States,5 Cover did not believe there was
an easy answer to this normative battle, because both mainstream
equality norms and the ideals of religious liberty had great worth.6
But Cover's central idea (the relationship between nomos and
narrative) need not be limited to the specific struggle that confronted
him. In fact, his work aids understanding of one of the most
important and confusing issues in antitrust: when to limit the range of
permissible inferences from circumstantial evidence at the summary
judgment stage. As this Article attempts to demonstrate, antitrust has
its own nomoi (substantive sub-worlds) and redemptive narrative
(focused on maximizing consumer welfare) interacting with one
another.
Summary judgment is a particularly important stage in antitrust
cases due to their potential length and complexity. The United States
government's case against IBM, for instance, took thirteen years to
complete, with the trial itself taking six years.7 The defendant's
motion for summary judgment has become a principal opportunity for
the court to dispense with clearly unmeritorious cases and to conserve
judicial resources. Hence, a critical issue in antitrust cases is the level
of evidence necessary for the plaintiff to defeat the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.8
In the 1960s and 1970s, the antitrust summary judgment standard
was relatively unambiguous. Summary procedures were to be used
''sparingly in complex antitrust litigation," as "the proof is largely in
the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken
the plot."9 As a result, many cases went to the jury-even those
4. E.g., id. at 28 ("The principle that troubled these amici [in Bob Jones
University v. United States] was the broad assertion that a mere 'public policy,'
however admirable, could triumph in the face of a claim to the first amendment's
special shelter against the crisis of conscience.").
5. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 1, at 66-68 & n.195.
7. See In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing
stipulation of dismissal of "what had been one of the nation's longest antitrust suits").
The seventeen-month median total length of private antitrust cases, from complaint
to termination, exceeds the nine-month median for federal litigation generally. Steven
C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74
Geo. L.J. 1001, 1009 (1986).
8. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 91-92 (1990) (describing how in the first quarter of 1988,
defendants filed 122 of 140 summary judgment motions in federal district courts).
9. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
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relying primarily on circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy-
because judges disallowed the inference of conspiracy only in the rare
instance that the defendant had "conclusively disproved [it] by pretrial
discovery,"1 as in First National Bank v. Cities Service Co.," or when
the specific antitrust claim faced substantive limitations.12
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chicago School scholarship 3 had
taken hold. A group of scholars, viewing antitrust laws through
advancements in industrial organization scholarship, attributed
increasing importance to setting legal rules and policies that
maximized consumer welfare (otherwise known as "economic
efficiency"). In response to this scholarship, the courts became more
attuned to the ex ante inefficiencies caused by the antitrust laws, 4
particularly antitrust's treble damages remedy, 5 and sought to relax
various prohibitions and thus make the laws more efficient-in
Cover's terms, "redemption" of the antitrust laws through
economics. 6 For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., the Court held that a single piece of circumstantial evidence
that could have resulted from either a conspiracy or independent
behavior was insufficient for a plaintiff to survive a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict."7 Monsanto stated that for a
plaintiff to defeat a motion for a directed verdict, he needs to present
evidence, direct or circumstantial, "that tends to exclude the
possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 8 The
"tends to exclude" standard was necessary when the circumstantial
evidence might have been caused by procompetitive behavior because
10. Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Mem'l Gardens, 394 U.S. 700, 704
(1969) (denying summary judgment when the inference of conspiracy was not
conclusively disproved).
11. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
12. See, e.g., infra note 261 (listing parallel refusal to deal cases where summary
procedures were deemed appropriate).
13. I use the term "Chicago School" scholarship broadly to refer to industrial
organization scholarship, much of it at the University of Chicago during the 1970s and
early 1980s, which found its way into jurisprudence, particularly antitrust. The origin
of the school is usually attributed to an antitrust course taught jointly by Aaron
Director and Edward Levi in the early 1950s. See, e.g., James May, Redirecting the
Future: Law and the Future and the Seeds of Change in Modern Antitrust Law, 17
Miss. C. L. Rev. 43 (1996).
14. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1984) (discussing the Court's increasing cognizance of ex
ante effects). The term "ex ante effects" refers to the predicted effects that a rule of
liability will have on future behavior.
15. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a treble-damages remedy to "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (a)(2000). It is a private enforcement
mechanism. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
16. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text (describing Cover's use of the
concept of redemption).
17. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,764 (1984).
18. Id.
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fear of paying treble damages would deter firms from partaking in the
procompetitive behavior in the first place."
In Matsushita Eiectric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,2° a 1986
predatory pricing case, efficiency concerns were central to the Court's
resolution again, as the Court tried to extrapolate Monsanto's
principles into the summary judgment context. The Court set forth
the current summary judgment standard:
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." But
antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from
ambiguous evidence in a [Sherman Act] § 1 case. Thus, in
[Monsanto], we held that conduct as consistent with permissible
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone,
support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. To survive a motion
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking
damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 'that tends to
exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted
independently. Respondents... must show that the inference of
conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of
independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed
respondents.2'
As the Court would explain later in the opinion, inferences should
be limited in predatory pricing cases because cutting prices (the main
evidence of the alleged conspiracy) was the very essence of
competition, and such price-cutting conduct would be deterred if
evidence of low prices sufficed to permit the inference of conspiracy.22
Nineteen years later, courts and commentators still struggle to
decipher what the Matsushita standard requires and how to reconcile
that with the Court's prior summary judgment jurisprudence, which
was generally plaintiff permissive.23 Matsushita's broad language
created many questions: Should judges limit inferences at the
summary judgment stage in all antitrust cases or only a subset (and, if
so, which subset)? When ascertaining whether the evidence "tends to
exclude" the possibility of independent action, should the judge weigh
the evidence? How are deterrence concerns related to that standard?
Does Matsushita apply outside antitrust? 24
19. Id.
20. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
21. Id. at 587-88 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764; First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
22. Id. at 594.
23. E.g., James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary
Judgment, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1523, 1576 (1995) ("[O]ur law governing summary
judgment is in a state of profound disarray and incoherence.").
24. Compare id. at 1569 n.173 (arguing that Matsushita applies outside antitrust),
and Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1987)
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In 1992, the Court tried to clarify the matter in Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc.25 In that decision, the Court claimed
that Matsushita "did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing
summary judgment in antitrust cases ... [as] Matsushita demands only
that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to reach
the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated,
in that decision. "26 The Court then refused to limit the range of
permissible inferences drawn from ambiguous evidence when the
observable behavior did not appear "always or almost always to
enhance competition" because the risk of deterring procompetitive
conduct was insubstantial.27
Despite Kodak's "clarification," various federal circuit courts have
had difficulty reconciling Kodak and Matsushita, especially in
conspiracy cases. As one certiorari petition from 1999 claimed,
several circuits cite Matsushita when the conspiracy is implausible
(usually affirming a grant of summary judgment for the defendant)
and Kodak when it is plausible (usually ruling that the case should
proceed to trial)."s The problem, with which Kodak only partially
grappled, is that the very definition of reasonableness had been
fundamentally altered by Matsushita, the history that preceded it, and
the consumer welfare "narrative" of which it was part. Reasonable, as
used in Matsushita, no longer referred simply to the case at hand. The
term "reasonable" had incorporated what I call a "case-external"
dimension, whereby the reasonableness of any specific inference in a
case also depended on how permitting the inference might affect
business competition more generally.
As this Article attempts to demonstrate, this alteration in the
meaning of reasonableness occurred in two ways. First, pre-
Matsushita, it occurred in the augmentation of the substantive
requirements in one particular sub-area of antitrust law (a nomos):
conscious parallelism cases. Conscious parallelism is when several
firms knowingly behave alike, typically setting prices, and the question
is whether this parallel behavior resulted due to a conspiracy (usually
(applying Matsushita in a non-antitrust case), with Williams v. Borough of West
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Matsushita's principles arguably apply
only to summary judgment motions in antitrust cases."), and William W. Schwarzer &
Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 45 Hastings L.J. 1, 6 (1993)
(claiming Matsushita "rests on a specific point of antitrust law").
25. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). For more on Matsushita's application outside of antitrust,
see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment. Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 1068-69 (2003).
26. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 479.
28. Petition for Certiorari, 7-Up Bottling Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 191
F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1218). But see In re High Fructose Corn Syrup
Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (relying on Matsushita
(and not Kodak) although finding the conspiracy to be plausible).
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illegal) 29 or independent decisions (permissible). 31 Since 1954, when
the Court said that evidence of consciously parallel behavior did not
demand a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff,31 the lower courts
have increasingly required that evidence of conscious parallelism be
supplemented with so-called plus factors32 before allowing a case to be
submitted to the jury, for only when plus factors are present does the
evidence "tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted
independently."33 Due in large part to scholarship by Donald Turner
and others, the plus-factor requirement really took hold in the circuit
courts in the mid-1970s, as a way both to differentiate plausible from
implausible conspiracies and to deal with the impossibility of devising
a judicially enforceable remedy for interdependent pricing.34 In fact,
in the lower court proceedings of Matsushita, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had relied upon the conscious
parallelism cases as justification for the proposition that inferences
may be limited at the summary judgment stage. Second, and more
directly related to Chicago School concerns, the definition of
reasonableness also changed to account for Matsushita's explicit
29. Some conspiracies are legal. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296-98 (1985) (applying the rule of reason to
concerted refusals to deal if the defendants lack market power or exclusive access to
an element essential to competition).
30. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 543-44
(1954).
31. Id. at 540-41.
32. "Plus factor" is nothing more than an "inelegant" label for "the additional
facts or factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action
amounts to a conspiracy." VI Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application I 1433(e) (2000).
Sometimes courts use the term "plus factor" explicitly to describe this inquiry for the
additional facts; other times, they merely look for the additional facts. Recent lower
court examples are: In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004);
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Merck-
Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *9
(4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (unpublished); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d
112, 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1999); and Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d
1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991). Pre-Matsushita examples include: In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 304 (3d Cir. 1983); Admiral
Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978); National Auto
Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1978);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977); Venzie Corp. v. United
States Mineral Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975); Delaware Valley
Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202-07 (3d Cir. 1961); and
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952). For
more pre-Matsushita cases, see infra note 274.
33. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1232-33 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 304) (the lower
court opinion in Matsushita).
34. See, e.g., infra notes 277-78 (describing Turner's influence and citing cases).
35. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 304.
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incorporation of Monsanto's "tends to exclude" standard and its
concerns with deterring procompetitive conduct.
Cover's metaphor of "nomos" and "narrative" provides a useful
orienting mechanism for understanding this transition in antitrust.
"Nomos," because some of these sub-areas of antitrust law are partly
insular and thus their own little sub-worlds: the Supreme Court, for
instance, has never expressly discussed the use of plus factors despite
their existence in circuit court doctrine for more than fifty years.
"Narrative," because the consumer welfare focus that developed from
Chicago School scholarship had as much of a transformative, and
indeed redemptive, effect on the antitrust laws as the civil rights
movement had on public law norms of equality more generally.
Nevertheless, the application of Cover's metaphor to antitrust
summary judgment comes with a twist. In Cover's work, the question
was whether equality norms should be applied to the religious insular
communities at all. That was because the insular communities truly
were separate from the mainstream. In the world of antitrust, such
separateness does not exist, as Chicago School concerns were, at the
very least, partly responsible for both the rise of the plus-factor
requirement within the conscious parallelism nomos and for the
development of antitrust law more generally. This difference,
however, between Cover's subject and antitrust does not mean his
metaphor is inapposite but simply that it applies differently. As this
Article attempts to explain, conscious parallelism cases had already
compensated for the relevant Chicago School concerns through
requiring certain kinds of plus factors to be set forth at the summary
judgment stage. Since Matsushita, several circuit courts have
attempted to limit inferences in conscious parallelism cases at the
summary judgment stage not only through requiring the existence of
certain types of plus factors but also by requiring that they meet a
higher burden of proof (applying the "tends to exclude" language of
Matsushita and Monsanto). This Article contends that the latter
requirement arguably represents an improper extension of the
deterrence concerns from Matsushita and Monsanto into a sub-area of
law in which they serve no role, thus overapplying Matsushita in the
conscious parallelism nomos. As this Article attempts to demonstrate,
this potential overapplication of the consumer welfare narrative
within the conscious parallelism nomos is just as troublesome as was
the application of the mainstream equality narrative to the insular
religious nomos at all.
This Article has six parts. Part I provides some background, briefly
describing the role of circumstantial evidence in summary judgment
disputes, the six major antitrust summary judgment precedents, and
Monsanto. Part II discusses the various ways that courts and
commentators have interpreted Matsushita and the strengths and
weaknesses of the various approaches. It then introduces my
1634 [Vol. 73
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understanding of Matsushita, which integrates several aspects of the
various approaches currently used. Part III describes the
development of the conscious parallelism nomos and the consumer
welfare narrative, further explaining their interrelation as part of the
transformation of the antitrust laws in the 1970s and 1980s. Part IV
then draws on this understanding of the conscious parallelism nomos
and the consumer welfare narrative to describe the relationship
between the various considerations of Matsushita and
"reasonableness." Part V explains how these considerations apply in
a subset of conscious parallelism cases-oligopoly parallel pricing
cases-discussing in particular how the Eleventh Circuit improperly
relied on Matsushita in the recent Williamson Oil case36 to enhance
the level of proof needed for a plaintiff to defeat a defendant's motion
for summary judgment when the evidence is primarily circumstantial.
It explains that, although there may be legitimate reasons to restrict a
plaintiff's use of circumstantial evidence in oligopoly parallel pricing
cases, it is wrong to attribute these reasons to Matsushita itself. Part
VI describes how my critique of several oligopoly parallel pricing
cases dovetails with Richard Posner's similar critique of the same
cases in his recent second version of Antitrust Law,37 and how our
critiques of the case law complement each other: We both argue that
lower courts have inappropriately extended the "tends to exclude"
requirement from Monsanto and Matsushita to the oligopoly pricing
context, 38 but we reach this result for different reasons. Posner
believes the error arises from considering interdependent pricing to be
inevitable,39  whereas I believe that the main problem is
overapplication of deterrence concerns.
I. BACKGROUND ANTITRUST SUMMARY JUDGMENT ELEMENTS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) establishes that:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.40
This rule authorizes summary judgment "only where the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear
what the truth is,... [and where] no genuine issue remains for trial...
,,41 It has been interpreted to require that "[o]n summary judgment
36. 346 F.3d at 1287.
37. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2001).
38. Id. at 99-100.
39. Id. at 69-100.
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
41. Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944).
1635
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the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."42
The judge, however, "is free to take the case from the jury if the non-
movant's interpretation of the indirect evidence is 'unreasonable."' 43
Part I examines the meaning of those general principles in the
section 1 antitrust context. Part L.A discusses why the range of
permissible inferences from circumstantial evidence is a significant
issue in section 1 cases. Part I.B describes seven important Supreme
Court cases on the matter: the six main antitrust summary judgment
precedents' and Monsanto (because of its incorporation in
Matsushita).
A. Circumstantial Evidence in Section 1 Cases
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
[is] illegal."4" It requires concerted action among multiple firms.46
This action is "horizontal" if it occurs among competitors at the same
level of market structure, and "vertical" if it occurs between parties at
different levels of the chain of distribution.47 To perhaps oversimplify,
questions on summary judgment are of two sorts: (1) Given the
observable behavior, what other facts can one infer, and (2) does
section 1 restrict that observed and inferred behavior? For example, a
summary judgment motion might turn on (1) whether the fact finder
may reasonably infer that an agreement existed from evidence of
parallel behavior, and (2) whether that agreement is illegal.
Inference limitation only applies to the first sort of question. These
questions are factual, even though the precise facts that are inferred
can have legal consequences48  and result from the use of
circumstantial evidence, such as firm pricing levels.49 (No inferences
are required from direct evidence to establish a fact.)5" Circumstantial
42. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
43. Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40
Stan. L. Rev. 491, 494 (1988) (citing Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, 637
F.2d 105, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1980); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1975)).
44. Many antitrust cases discuss when a directed verdict is appropriate, such as the
Theatre Enterprises case. See infra Part I.B.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
46. E.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-77 (1984).
47. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,730 (1988).
48. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939)
(discussing how "[als is usual in cases of alleged unlawful agreements .. , the
government is without the aid of direct testimony .... [it] is compelled to rely on
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators" to establish
agreement). Circumstantial evidence is sometimes called "indirect evidence."
50. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1233 (3d Cir. 1993). Direct evidence is either documentary or the first-hand
testimony of a witness who perceived the events. Its primary issues are genuineness
1636 [Vol. 73
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evidence "is, by definition, consistent with both competing theories [of
legal and illegal behavior]. Inferences can be drawn from the
evidence that would support either the movant or the non-movant,
although the inferences may not be equally plausible."'"
This dual plausibility often makes section 1 summary judgment
determinations difficult because judges want to punish illegal behavior
but also generally prefer not to intervene in the normal course of
business affairs.52 Moreover, it is a significant area of contention in
conspiracy cases in particular, for while many conspiracies are per se
illegal (automatically illegal once the fact finder infers that a
conspiracy exists),53 strong direct evidence (such as secret memos and
tapes of discussions) is rare.54 Hence, the central issue in many section
1 cases is whether the judge should permit the fact finder to infer a
conspiracy from the circumstantial evidence.5
Part I.B describes the six major antitrust summary judgment
precedents, as well as Monsanto (because of the large role it plays in
Matsushita). Part I.B is intended to be a purely neutral description of
the relevant cases, laying out the basic issue of each case and how the
Court chose to resolve it. Substantive analysis of the opinions begins
later in Part II.
B. The Six Major Antitrust Summary Judgment Cases (and Monsanto)
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.56 asserted the basic
principle that antitrust cases were not well suited to summary
procedures. Poller involved a cancelled affiliation contract between
CBS and one of its UHF-based outlets, which Poller alleged was part
of a conspiracy by CBS and others to destroy UHF broadcasting and
protect CBS's "vast interest in VHF stations throughout the United
and credibility, and it is exclusively the province of a jury. Collins, supra note 43, at
494. But see Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 Marq. L.
Rev. 141, 173 (2000) (explaining how "[c]ourts have begun gingerly to approach
credibility issues on summary judgment").
51. Collins, supra note 43, at 494.
52. In the corporate law context, this is witnessed through the business judgment
rule. In antitrust cases, this nonintervention preference can be seen in the last couple
of decades through the rise of analysis under the rule of reason as well as the
requirement of certain predicate facts before attaching per se liability. See infra Part
III.C.1.
53. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing how most conspiracies are per se illegal).
54. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
55. VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 1410(c) ("The practical issue in
actual litigation will often be the propriety of allowing a jury to infer the existence of
an agreement from indirect evidence."). The range of permissible, or perhaps even
mandated, inferences can play a large role in non-conspiracy cases too, such as in
Kodak, described infra text accompanying notes 104-14, in terms of whether certain
facts can be presumed true without proof of actual market conditions.
56. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
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States.,5 7 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
CBS, considering the cancellation "the normal right of a producer to
select the outlet for its product."58 The Supreme Court reversed,
claiming that it was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
cancellation was independently motivated by CBS:
It may be that upon all of the evidence a jury would be with the
respondents. But we cannot say on this record that "it is quite clear
what the truth is." Certainly there is no conclusive evidence
supporting the respondents' theory. We look at the record on
summary judgment in the light most favorable to Poller, the party
opposing the motion, and conclude here that it should not have been
granted. We believe that summary procedures should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent
play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when
the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be
appraised .9
Seven years later, the Court decided Norfolk Monument Co. v.
Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc.,6 bolstering the notion that
summary procedures should be used sparingly in antitrust cases. In
Norfolk Monument, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had
conspired to engage in various activities aimed at decreasing the
plaintiff's sales in order to monopolize the manufacture and sale of
bronze grave markers in violation of section 1 and section 2 of the
Sherman Act.6 The case was based almost entirely on circumstantial
evidence of restrictive rules the defendants had adopted that operated
to the plaintiff's detriment (such as "[d]espite the unskilled nature of
the work, all of the memorial parks refuse to permit the plaintiff to
install markers sold by it; all of them insist that the work be done by
the cemeteries themselves").62 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, reversed the district court's grant of the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, citing how "[the] justification for these
restrictive rules was disputed by the petitioner . . . . The
reasonableness of the rules was a material question of fact whose
resolution was the function of the jury and not of the court on a
motion for summary judgment."63  It was irrelevant that the key
57. Id. at 466.
58. Id. at 468.
59. Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted).
60. 394 U.S. 700 (1969) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 701.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 702-03.
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evidence was circumstantial;' the Court, heeding Poller, claimed that
summary judgment was inappropriate as the plaintiff's case had not
been "conclusively disproved by pretrial discovery."65
Similarly, in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
the Court reversed an appellate decision affirming a grant of summary
judgment in a tying case.66 In Fortner, the plaintiffs sought to obtain
loans from the United States Steel Corp. for buying land.67  The
United States Steel Corp. agreed to provide the loans if the plaintiffs
agreed to erect a prefabricated house manufactured by United States
Steel Homes Credit Corp. (a wholly owned subsidiary of United
States Steel Corp.). 68 Relying on earlier precedent, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, noting, among
other deficiencies, that United States Steel Corp. did not have market
power over the tying product (money).69  The Supreme Court
reversed, observing the possibility that the Credit Corp.'s "uniquely
and unusually advantageous terms can reflect a creditor's unique
economic advantages."7 Heeding Poller's language that "summary
judgment in antitrust cases is disfavored," the Court held that
summary judgment was improper even though it was possible "that
these allegations [of a unique economic advantage] will not be
sustained when the case goes to trial."'"
But, even in this plaintiff-permissive era, summary judgment was
appropriate when pretrial discovery had conclusively disproved the
plaintiff's case. Such was the situation in Cities Service.72 In that case,
it was acknowledged that several oil companies maintained a
worldwide oil cartel and a conspiracy to boycott Iranian Oil in all
markets.73 At issue was whether the evidence of Cities Service's
64. Id. at 704 (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 540 (1954) ("[Blusiness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from
which the fact finder may infer agreement.")).
65. Id.
66. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1969).
67. Id. at 497.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 498.
70. Id. at 505.
71. Id.; id. at 506 ("[O]n the record before us it would be impossible to reach such
conclusions as a matter of law, and it is not our function to speculate as to the
ultimate findings of fact."). On remand, a jury, and later a judge in a bench trial, both
rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. When the
case again came to the Supreme Court, however, the Court unanimously reversed
both lower courts noting that the type of unique credit terms "will not give rise to any
inference of economic power in the credit market." United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977). I thank Professor Thomas Morgan for
drawing my attention to Fortner. His casebook, Thomas D. Morgan, Cases and
Materials on Modern Antitrust Law and Its Origins (2d ed. 2001), discusses the
opinions in Fortner I and Fortner H well.
72. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,289-90 (1968).
73. Id. at 259-60.
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refusal to deal with the plaintiff, which paralleled the other
companies' refusal to deal with him, supported the inference that
Cities Service was part of the conspiracy. 4 The Supreme Court held
that it did not, affirming the grant of Cities Service's motion for
summary judgment.75 It noted that in the absence of contradictory
evidence, the inference of conspiracy from the parallel-refusal-to-deal
evidence would be reasonable.76  However, in light of the
"overwhelming" evidence to the contrary concerning the divergence
of Cities Service's business interests from those of the other oil
companies and its lack of economic motive to partake in the
conspiracy (Cities Service had no interests in foreign oil, whereas the
other conspirators did),77 the "competing" inference of independent
action was "much more plausible. ' 78 The Court thus held that the
inference of conspiracy as to Cities Service was unreasonable.7 9
Such was the situation before Monsanto, which involved a
defendant's motion for a directed verdict." At issue in Monsanto was
whether one could reasonably infer a vertical price-fixing conspiracy
from the sole fact that a manufacturer had terminated a distributor
after other distributors had complained about the price cutting.8 The
question was difficult because, under United States v. Colgate & Co.,82
a manufacturer could legally set retail prices in advance and terminate
noncompliant distributors, but, under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co.,83 it was illegal for a manufacturer and distributor
to set prices together in advance, and evidence of termination was
consistent with both courses of conduct. As the Court recognized,
particular care was required when determining whether to allow an
inference of conspiracy because those terminations permitted by
Colgate were often procompetitive when used to facilitate the
74. Id. at 286.
75. Id. at 284-88.
76. Id. at 277
77. Id. at 278-84 (discussing Cities Service's substantial fear of nationalization); id.
at 279 ("Petitioner himself consistently argues that Cities' interests in this entire
situation were directly opposed to those of the other defendants. The others had
large supplies of foreign oil; Cities did not. The others allegedly were members of an
international cartel to control foreign oil; Cities was not.").
78. Id. at 277, 285 (differentiating Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368
U.S. 464, 472-73 (1962)).
79. Id. at 287 ("Here [the plaintiff] is unable to point to any benefits to be
obtained by Cities from refusing to deal with him and, therefore, the inference of
conspiracy sought to be drawn from Cities' 'parallel refusal to deal' does not logically
follow." (citation omitted)).
80. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). Substantive
antitrust law changed greatly between 1969 (and Norfolk Monument) and 1984 (and
Monsanto). See infra Part III.C.
81. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 759.
82. 250 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1919).
83. 220 U.S. 373, 404-09 (1911).
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adoption of non-price restraints that protected against "free riders,"84
and might be deterred by too lenient an evidentiary standard.85 To
reduce this risk of deterrence from allowing the inference of
conspiracy, the Court set forth the "tends to exclude" requirement:
[S]omething more than evidence of complaints is needed. There
must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting
independently.... [T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the
manufacturer and others "had a conscious commitment to a
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective., 8 6
The Court considered the "tends to exclude" standard necessary,
because "[i]f an inference of such an agreement may be drawn from
highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the
doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously
eroded,"87 and the possibility of treble damages would cause an
"irrational dislocation"88 in the market. Thus, the mere fact that a
price-cutter was terminated was itself insufficient to allow an
inference of conspiracy. Nevertheless, the Court held that the
plaintiff's verdict was ultimately proper in light of "unambiguous"
evidence of conspiracy in the form of a newsletter relating to price-
level enforcement policies.89
Matsushita came two years later, building on Monsanto's
foundation.9" Matsushita involved an alleged predatory pricing
conspiracy among twenty-four Japanese electronics manufacturers,
whereby the Japanese manufacturers were selling their products at
high prices in Japan but pricing their American products low to drive
certain American electronics manufacturers out of the market.91
Zenith, the plaintiff, had presented evidence of parallel actions by
these firms, from which it claimed that a jury could infer the existence
84. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-63 ("The manufacturer often will want to ensure
that its distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and
training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of the product,
and will want to see that 'free-riders' do not interfere." (citing Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977)).
85. Id. at 763 (stating how complaints about price-cutters are "natural" and
"unavoidable" reactions by distributors to the activities of their rivals and discussing
how lenient evidentiary standards might deter firms from adopting beneficial non-
price restraints).
86. Id. at 764.
87. Id. at 763.
88. Id. at 764.
89. Id. at 765-66. Interestingly, Monsanto did not cite First National Bank v. Cities
Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968).
90. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
91. Id. at 577-78.
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of a conspiracy.92 The district court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment.93 The Third Circuit reversed as to twenty-one
defendants, holding that Zenith had presented sufficient evidence of
conspiracy. 94  The Supreme Court reversed, mostly because it
disagreed with the Third Circuit's application of the summary
judgment standard to the facts. 95
The majority opinion is worth parsing in sequence, starting with its
Section III. After first discussing general principles concerning what
qualifies as a "genuine issue for trial," the Court immediately cited
Cities Service for the proposition "that if the factual context renders
respondents' claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes
no economic sense-respondents must come forward with more
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be
necessary."96  Very shortly thereafter is the passage quoted in the
introduction of this Article, recasting Monsanto's holding in terms of
the relative plausibility of inferences and citing Cities Service for
additional support:
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts... must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." But
antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from
ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case. Thus, in [Monsanto], we held that
conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal
conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of
antitrust conspiracy. [Monsanto; Cities Service.] To survive a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff
seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence "that
tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted
independently. [Monsanto.] Respondents... must show that the
inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing
inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not
have harmed respondents. [Cities Service.]97
Section IV.A of the opinion discussed why predatory pricing
schemes are implausible based on economic theory because predatory
pricing is unlikely to work, especially costly when it fails, and
92. Id. at 580-81; see also Collins, supra note 43, at 496 n.20 (describing the
evidence of parallel behavior).
93. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
94. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
95. Id.
96. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 578.
97. Id. at 587-88 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
(1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968) (other internal
citations omitted)); see also Collins, supra note 43, at 508 (discussing how Monsanto
"never even mentioned the relative plausibility or consistency of the inferences").
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therefore self-deterring.9 8 In Section IV.B, the opinion returned to
Monsanto, this time emphasizing its deterrence concerns:
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are
implausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter
procompetitive conduct. Respondents... seek to establish this
conspiracy indirectly, through evidence.., of rebates and other
price-cutting activities .... But cutting prices in order to increase
business often is the very essence of competition. Thus, mistaken
inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.
"[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a
search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up
by discouraging legitimate price competition."
99
In Section V, the Court revisited the issue of economic
implausibility, basing its decision not to permit the inference of
conspiracy on lack of motive.1"0 Yet, in footnote twenty-one, the
Court claimed that the "tends to exclude" standard applied to
plausible allegations too:
We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to
conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of
conspiracy. [Monsanto] establishes that conduct that is as consistent
with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
without more, support even an inference of conspiracy. 0 '
Justice White's dissent critiqued this "confused" holding:
In a similar vein, the Court summarizes [Monsanto], as holding that
"courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such
inferences are implausible. .. ." Such language suggests that a judge
hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust
case should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry
and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the
plaintiff. Cities Service and Monsanto do not stand for any such
98. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588-93; see also id. at 594-95 ("As we
earlier explained, predatory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in
order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the gains depend on a host of
uncertainties, making such schemes more likely to fail than to succeed." (internal
citation omitted)). Among other sources, Matsushita cites Robert H. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox 149-55 (1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981); and Phillip Areeda & Donald
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
88 Harv. L. Rev. 697,699 (1975).
99. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 593-94 (citations and footnotes
omitted).
100. Id. at 596-97 ("Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions
that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational
economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally
plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy.").
101. Id. at 597 n.21 (citations omitted).
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proposition. Each of those cases simply held that a particular piece
of evidence standing alone was insufficiently probative to justify
sending a case to the jury. These holdings in no way undermine the
doctrine that all evidence must be construed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
If the Court intends to give every judge hearing a motion for
summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of determining if the
evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not,
it is overturning settled law. If the Court does not intend such a
pronouncement, it should refrain from using unnecessarily broad
and confusing language. 10 2
He then discussed how the predatory pricing conspiracy might have
been plausible if the Japanese companies favored growth over profit
maximization. 113
Perhaps heeding Justice White's concerns, Kodak"° tried to clarify
the situation; but Kodak was not a conspiracy case, so its effect was
limited. Kodak involved eighteen independent service organizations
("ISOs") alleging that Eastman Kodak had adopted policies to limit
the availability of parts used to service its equipment." 5 The ISOs
alleged that through these policies, Kodak tied the sale of service for
its equipment to the sale of parts, violating section 1.106 The principle
issue concerned a tying law prerequisite: "whether a defendant's lack
of market power in the primary equipment market precludes-as a
matter of law-the possibility of market power in derivative
aftermarkets."'' 7 The district court held yes, granting Kodak's motion
for summary judgment."8 The Ninth Circuit reversed. 0 9 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. In so affirming, the
Kodak Court addressed Matsushita:
Because the defendants had every incentive not to engage in the
alleged conduct ... the Court found an "absence of any rational
motive to conspire." In that context, the Court determined that the
plaintiffs' theory of predatory pricing.., was "speculative," and was
not "reasonable." Accordingly, the Court held.., that summary
judgment would be appropriate [unless the plaintiffs] came forward
with more persuasive evidence to support their theory.
The Court's requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs' claims
make economic sense did not introduce a special burden on
plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases. The Court did
102. Id. at 600-01 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
103. Id. at 604.
104. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
105. Id. at 455.
106. Id. at 459. There also was a section 2 (monopolization) claim.
107. Id. at 455.
108. Id. at 456.
109. Id.
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not hold that if the moving party enunciates any economic theory
supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the
actual market, it is entitled to summary judgment. Matsushita
demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable
in order to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but
merely articulated, in that decision.1
The Court later rejected Kodak's argument that it was entitled to a
presumption that it lacked aftermarket market power as a matter of
law, reasoning that the plaintiffs' claims made "economic sense" when
considering actual market conditions (such as the presence of
switching costs that might have locked consumers into using Kodak
equipment and to thus require Kodak service). 1 ' According to the
Court, the risk of deterring procompetitive conduct did not warrant a
conclusive presumption that Kodak lacked aftermarket power as a
matter of law in these circumstances, as
the facts in this case are just the opposite [of Matsushita]. The
alleged conduct-higher service prices and market foreclosure-is
facially anticompetitive and exactly the harm that antitrust laws aim
to prevent. In this situation, Matsushita does not create any
presumption in favor of summary judgment for the defendant.' 12
As the Court explained, Kodak's behavior was not sufficiently
procompetitive on its face as to warrant limiting the range of
permissible inferences at the summary judgment stage:
We need not decide whether Kodak's behavior has any
procompetitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak's service and parts
policy is simply not one that appears always or almost always to
enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal presumption
without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case,
when we weigh the risk of deterring procompetitive behavior by
proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior will go
unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.1 13
Justice Scalia dissented, disagreeing not with the majority's
interpretation of Matsushita, but with the holding that tying
arrangements were per se illegal. He claimed that the rule of reason
should apply to aftermarket ties because they might serve various
procompetitive functions. 4
Kodak's attempted clarification still left several questions open,
such as: Where a competing inference of independent action exists,
does a judge have to weigh that inference against the inference of
110. Id. at 468.
111. Id. at 477-78 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 478.
113. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 502 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1645
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conspiracy? How is implausibility related to deterring procompetitive
conduct? And, how are both implausibility and deterrence concerns
related to reasonableness? Part II analyzes how post-Matsushita
courts and commentators have responded.
II. INTERPRETING MATSUSHITA
In general, courts and commentators have interpreted Matsushita in
three ways: (1) the "tends to exclude" requirement applies in all
antitrust cases; (2) the "tends to exclude" requirement applies only
when the sought inference is implausible; and (3) the "tends to
exclude" requirement applies when there is a significant risk of
deterring procompetitive conduct. Part II.A discusses each of these
approaches in turn.
A. The Three Readings of Matsushita
1. Universal Applicability
The broadest reading of Matsushita would apply the "tends to
exclude" requirement to all antitrust situations. It would commit
judges to weighing 15 the plausibility (or consistency) of inferences
against one another at the summary judgment stage. Only if the judge
believes the plaintiff's inference to be more likely does the case go to
the jury.1 16
A literal reading of Matsushita supports this broad reading.
Matsushita claims that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible
inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case," '117 without
qualifying the "a" to describe a particular subset of section 1 cases.
Matsushita also plainly cites Monsanto for the proposition that equal
inferential consistency does not suffice to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.1 1 8  Furthermore, this reading makes sense of
footnote twenty-one's claim that inferences should be limited when
the conspiratorial motive is plausible. 9
115. But see Duane, supra note 23, at 1557 (discussing two different models of
weighing).
116. Riverview Inv., Inc. v. Ottawa Cmty. Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474, 483
(6th Cir. 1990).
117. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(emphasis added).
118. But see supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing how Monsanto does
not really claim this).
119. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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Some lower courts have adopted this reading, 12 and it clearly is the
focus of Justice White's Matsushita dissent.12 1 Several commentators,
even the esteemed Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, have
suggested the viability of this approach to Matsushita.22 Other times,
however, it serves as the strawman against which commentators
support "alternative" readings. 123  This broad reading is often
considered a strawman because of its obvious problems. For instance,
it seems inconsistent with Kodak, which refused to presume the lack
of aftermarket market power and stated that Matsushita did not
dictate any inference limitation in that case.124 It also is probably
inconsistent with Cities Service as well, as many lower courts refused
to interpret Cities Service to require a judge to grant summary
judgment "solely on the grounds that he thought the defendant's
inference was the more probable one., 125  Finally, this reading
contradicts clear pronouncements outside the antitrust context that
the jury should be responsible for weighing the evidence.126
2. Implausibility
This reading applies the "tends to exclude" requirement when the
inference sought is implausible, either because of the case's specific
facts (as in Cities Service) or theoretical implausibility (as with
predatory pricing cases).127  It recognizes that although the
circumstantial evidence may have been produced by both permissible
120. E.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir.
2004); The Corner Pocket v. Video Lottery Techs., Inc., 123 F.3d 1107, 1112 (8th Cir.
1997); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1167-68 (6th Cir. 1995). My standard
for adoption is citing Matsushita's "tends to exclude" language without any
qualifications on its applicability.
121. See supra text accompanying note 102.
122. VI Areeda and Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 1405 (claiming without
qualification that "a conspiracy may not be found unless the evidence reasonably
suggests that it is more likely than not"); see also Stephen Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the
Antitrust System, 74 Geo. L.J. 1065 (1986) (discussing how Matsushita may mean this
broad reading).
123. Collins, supra note 43, at 501-07.
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. Collins, supra note 43, at 502 (citing Serv. Merch. Co. v. Boyd Corp., 722 F.2d
945, 949 (1st Cir. 1983); AT&T v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100, 101
(5th Cir. 1978)). But see Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977)
(citing First National Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968), as establishing
the proposition that a conspiracy may not be inferred unless "the circumstances...
make the inference of rational, independent choice less attractive than that of
concerted action").
126. E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Lavender v.
Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1946).
127. Scholars debate whether theoretical implausibility should suffice, and some
claim Kodak "tames" that aspect of Matsushita. E.g., Lisa Meckfessel Judson, Note,
Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.: The Taming of Matsushita and the Chicago School,
1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1633 (1993).
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and impermissible behavior, the implausibility of the allegations
makes the inference of illegal concerted action less likely to be true.
The judge therefore requires stronger evidence than normally
necessary to permit the inference.
This implausibility reading coheres with Cities Service's focus on
lack of motive. Perhaps more importantly, it is consistent with how
both Matsushita and Kodak state the "tends to exclude" requirement
after discussing implausibility concerns. 118 And, this reading accords
with the Court's contemporaneous non-antitrust summary judgment
pronouncements in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., where the Court
applied a heightened level of scrutiny at the summary judgment stage
to a substantively implausible defamation case.'29
Lower courts have applied this reading both within antitrust cases 30
and non-antitrust ones,"' the most famous application being Judge
Posner's opinion in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust
Litigation.32 Several commentators have embraced it as well.'33 This
reading, however, is incomplete. Matsushita's footnote twenty-one
claims that the "tends to exclude" standard applies even when a
plausible motive to conspire exists,' which at least means that more
than implausibility can trigger application of a heightened standard.
128. Supra text accompanying notes 96-97, 110.
129. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52 (describing how defamation suits were
substantively disfavored due to First Amendment protections provided to the
investigative media under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
Anderson involved a libel suit (concerning limited-purpose public figures) subject to
New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 245. The main question of the case was whether
the clear and convincing evidence requirement of New York Times must be
considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247. The
Court held that a heightened evidentiary standard did apply at the summary judgment
stage. Id. at 252.
130. E.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 568 n.29 (11th
Cir. 1998); Ezzo's Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 94 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir.
1996); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1987).
131. E.g., Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994); McLaughlin v. Liu,
849 F.2d 1205, 1207-09 (9th Cir. 1988); Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc.,
828 F.2d 291, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1987).
132. 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002). Writing extra-judicially, Judge Posner has
set forth thorough criteria for when a plaintiff's allegation of conspiracy does and
does not make economic sense. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 37, at 69-100; see also
infra Part VI (discussing Posner's work more thoroughly).
133. Duane, supra note 23, at 1568; David F. Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act
Through an Extension of Colgate: The Matsushita Case, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 261 (1988).
134. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 n.21
(1986). But see Shores, supra note 133, at 302 (explaining how Matsushita's footnote
twenty-one contradicts Cities Service's statement that it would have permitted the
inference if the defendant had not introduced contrary evidence of lack of motive).
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3. Deterring Procompetitive Conduct
This reading interprets the "tends to exclude" requirement as a
precautionary measure. It focuses on how "any company engaged in
the innocent conduct could not help but do the very thing which
plaintiff suggested should be proof of illegal conduct."'35 If the court
allows an inference of illegal conduct from the observed behavior,
companies will forego the innocent conduct out of fear of antitrust's
treble damages remedy, hence deterring the innocent conduct. This
reading limits the range of permissible inferences when the innocent
conduct is procompetitive because the deterrence of that conduct
causes overall societal loss, defeating the purposes of the Sherman
Act. Stronger evidence is required to minimize these external effects.
This reading justifies the holdings in Monsanto, Matsushita, and
Kodak. The Court limited inferences in Monsanto and Matsushita
(where the observable behavior appeared procompetitive) and did not
in Kodak (where the behavior was facially anticompetitive). It also
explains why inferences may be limited when the conspiratorial
motive is plausible, as in Monsanto, as procompetitive conduct may
produce the same circumstantial evidence as a plausible conspiracy.
Further, it is consistent with Anderson's concern with chilling the
media's First Amendment rights. 36
This reading has surfaced in a Ninth Circuit opinion'37 and in
scholarship.'38 Despite its strengths, it has technical, historical, and
substantive problems. The technical problem is that neither
Matsushita nor Kodak mentions deterring procompetitive conduct
when introducing the "tends to exclude" requirement; both decisions
only declare deterrence concerns later in the opinion. 39 The historical
problem is that previous summary judgment cases, such as Cities
Service, did not discuss deterrence issues, even though inferences were
limited there as well. The substantive problem is that there are many
situations in which inferences should be limited even though the
behavior is not procompetitive in the sense that Monsanto and
135. Collins, supra note 43, at 508.
136. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 85.
137. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990) ("We think that the key to the proper interpretation
of Matsushita lies in the Court's emphasis on the dangers of permitting inferences
from certain types of ambiguous evidence ... [and the] inference's possible
anticompetitive side-effects."). Petroleum Products also requires that the defendant's
conduct be consistent with other plausible motivations before inquiring into the
deterrent effects. Id. at 440.
138. Collins, supra note 43, at 507-12. Collins, however, thinks that "the issues of
deterrence and reasonableness are logically distinct," and therefore "a rule to avoid
deterrent effects supplements ... the basic test that all inferences be reasonable." Id.
at 509. 1 disagree, as I believe the amount of deterred procompetitive conduct affects
which inferences are reasonable. See infra Part IV.B.2.
139. Supra text accompanying notes 96-97, 110.
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Matsushita use the term, as I explain to be the case in oligopoly
parallel pricing cases in Part V.
These three interrelated problems arise from reducing Matsushita
to a unitary focus. For that reason, some courts and commentators
have adopted an approach that integrated these elements. The Third
Circuit limits inferences based on implausibility, deterrence concerns,
and substantive law. 4' So do William Schwarzer and Alan Hirsch. 4
The problem, however, is that none of these sources explains why all
these prongs are related to reasonableness. 42 Thus, others seem
reticent to follow.
I too believe an integrated approach best captures the history
underlying the development of the summary judgment standard. Part
II.B briefly introduces my understanding of Matsushita, which Parts
III and IV attempt to justify, and Part V applies.
B. The Three Considerations of Matsushita 43
In my view, the most accurate reading of the existing case law 44 is
that a judge should limit the range of permissible inferences at the
summary judgment stage when:
140. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]wo
important circumstances underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita
[were] (1) [that] the plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy was implausible [and] (2) [that]
permitting an inference of antitrust conspiracy in the circumstances 'would have the
effect of deterring significant procompetitive conduct."') (quoting Petruzzi's IGA
Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also
Intervest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); In re
Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1999) (same). Petruzzi's
discusses substantive law limitations directly after discussing what Matsushita
requires. See Petruzzi's, 998 F.3d at 1232. Baby Food discusses substantive law
limitations in an entirely different part of the opinion. See In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d
at 128, 132-38. In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit also appears to take this
position. See Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999
WL 691840, at *6 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999).
141. Schwarzer & Hirsch, supra note 24, at 7.
It is reasonable to conclude from Kodak that, once an antitrust defendant
moves beyond established substantive law principles that limit the range of
permissible inferences and seeks summary judgment based on economic
theory, the defendant 'bears a substantial burden in showing that.., despite
evidence of increased prices and excluded competition, [plaintiff's inference]
of market power [drawn from defendant's conduct] is unreasonable'
[because of the risk of deterring procompetitive conduct].
Id. (footnotes omitted). Implausibility concerns are part of these "established
substantive law principles."
142. Schwarzer and Hirsch primarily attempt to reconcile Kodak and Matsushita
with non-antitrust summary judgment jurisprudence. See id. at 10-20.
143. I fully expect this part to be a bit confusing at this point. But I think it will
make sense after the history underlying it has been explained.
144. As I describe infra, this reading of the case law may or may not be normatively
desirable. This Article attempts to avoid the normative debate on the optimal
summary judgment standard as much as possible. Rather, it attempts merely to
explain why and how the case law developed as it did and discuss how a judge whose
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(1) (Implausibility) the specific claim is factually implausible;
(2) (Deterrence) the observable business behavior under question
appears "always or almost always to enhance competition"; and
(3) (Substantive Law) the substantive antitrust law governing this
type of claim traditionally requires inferences to be limited.
Although these really are three types of considerations, it is easiest
to think of each as its own prong in a three-part test: The
implausibility prong is directed primarily at situations where some
circumstantial evidence might cohere with either conspiratorial or
independent behavior if considered by itself, but the facts, when taken
as a whole, make the inference of conspiracy implausible. Cities
Service is one example. The deterrence prong generally addresses
situations where the defendants' behavior in a particular case would
have occurred whether a conspiracy existed or not, but a need to limit
inferences arises due to concerns about how allowing such influences
in the particular case could affect the economy as a whole. As I
explain in more detail below, the deterrence prong causes a judge to
look to the frequency of how often the business behavior under
question appears to be procompetitive: Inferences are only limited
when the observable business behavior appears "always or almost
always to enhance competition" - a threshold level of
competitiveness. This prong encompasses what is generally referred
to as "theoretical implausibility" because it is those very situations
when the behavior appears always or almost always to enhance
competition that theorists tend to posit that the alleged conspiracy is
implausible. Finally, inferences are sometimes limited by the
substantive requirements governing the relevant sub-area of antitrust
law involved. For instance, in conscious parallelism cases, plaintiffs
must produce evidence of certain plus factors in addition to evidence
of parallel behavior to defeat a defendant's motion for summary
judgment. The substantive law prong addresses all such substantive
evidentiary requirements.
There is, of course, some pairwise overlap between the "prongs."
For instance, in conspiracy cases, deterrence concerns implicate the
existence of factual implausability because the observable conduct is
unlikely to be part of a conspiracy when it appears "always or almost
always to enhance competition" (2-1 overlap), and vice-versa, as
"courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such
sole goal is fidelity to the case law would decide cases at the summary judgment stage.
Some normative discussion is thus of course required because part of the reason the
case law developed as it did was due to certain normative beliefs. But, I have tried to
restrict my efforts in this Article to being descriptive of these normative elements and
not independently weighing in on the matter. I leave it to the reader to judge how
well this is accomplished.
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inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often
to deter procompetitive conduct"1 45 (1-2 overlap). And, implausibility
concerns bespeak substantive law limitations. Motive, for example, is
a plus factor in conscious parallelism cases. Hence, limiting the range
of permissible inferences because of the lack of motive can be
interpreted either as applying the implausibility prong or applying the
substantive law prong (1-3 overlap). Finally, there is significant
overlap between the deterrence prong and the substantive law prong
because the whole purpose of having a deterrence prong is to protect
specific types of facially procompetitive behavior, which is usually
reflected in how the rules governing certain sub-areas of antitrust law
are designed (2-3 overlap). In fact, virtually every application of the
first two prongs could be viewed as a substantive requirement of that
sub-area of antitrust law, although not necessarily vice-versa.
Nevertheless, there are three advantages to keeping the three
considerations separate as "prongs." First, although significant
overlap exists, there are some situations where only one consideration
applies. As I display with oligopoly parallel pricing cases (a subset of
conscious parallelism cases), the range of permissible inferences is
substantively limited even though the underlying business behavior is
not particularly desirable. As such, inferences are limited because of
the substantive law considerations (3) but not deterrence concerns (2),
and even when the alleged conspiracy is plausible in light of all the
facts (1). Second, and less intuitive, this three-pronged formulation
provides greater analytical clarity by differentiating between
situations in which inferences are limited solely because of "consumer
welfare" concerns and those that are not. As I have defined each
aspect of my proposed approach, the implausibility prong tracks
traditional summary judgment concerns; the deterrence prong tracks
those concerns that have arisen anew due to advances in industrial
organization scholarship and the "consumer welfare" narrative; and
the substantive law prong tracks those limitations of each nomos,
regardless of whether the nomos incorporates Chicago School
concerns or not. Third, this three-pronged formulation is more
adaptive in light of scholarly developments than a more conflated
analysis. Many current scholars, for instance, dispute Matsushita's
conclusion that predatory pricing conspiracies actually are
theoretically implausible.146 Nonetheless, these same critics seem to
145. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593 (1986)
(referencing Monsanto).
146. E.g., William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for
Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 Yale L.J. 1 (1979); Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory
Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000); Aaron S.
Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941 (2002); Oliver E.
Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284
(1977); see also Alvin Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of
Predatory Pricing, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. Notes & Proc. 162 (1993) (describing the lack
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agree that cutting prices is the very essence of competition and thus
might be comfortable limiting inferences because of deterrence
concerns, even when the alleged conspiracy is plausible in the case at
hand.
Outlining the application of this three-part formulation to Cities
Service, Monsanto, Matsushita, and Kodak will perhaps make its
contours clearer. Cities Service is the paradigmatic example of when
inferences would be limited because of implausibility concerns.
There, one piece of evidence was consistent with both independent
and conspiratorial behavior but the rest of the evidence did not
support Cities Service's participation in the conspiracy because it
lacked motive.'47 In Monsanto, inferences would be limited because
of deterrence concerns. As the Monsanto Court admitted, the alleged
conspiracy was plausible, but the range of permissible inferences from
evidence of termination was limited nonetheless because of the risk of
deterring Colgate-permitted, Sylvania-encouraged conduct. 14 8  In
Matsushita, inferences would certainly be limited because of
deterrence concerns; application of the implausibility prong, however,
would be more defendant-specific. As the Third Circuit explained, it
appeared to be plausible from the facts that twenty-one of the
defendants had engaged in a predatory pricing conspiracy.149
Although the Supreme Court did reverse the Third Circuit's
determination, the reversal was primarily because the Court believed
predatory pricing conspiracies to be theoretically implausible. 5 °
According to my three-pronged formulation, theoretical implausibility
is treated differently from factual implausibility. The implausibility
prong applies only when defendants can point to specific facts that
make the existence of a conspiracy implausible. Theoretical
implausibility, the notion that the conduct is unlikely to be part of a
conspiracy because it appears to benefit the economy, is addressed
under the deterrence prong. In Kodak, the range of permissible
inferences would not be limited, as none of the various considerations
would apply. Tying law has no inherent evidentiary limitations in that
context; the allegation was plausible; and the observable conduct was
not sufficiently procompetitive as to warrant the need to protect
against deterrence.
Admittedly, even this explanation is confusing, especially for those
not familiar with this area of antitrust law. It will hopefully be clearer
of influence of modern economics on the courts because of the difficulty keeping up
with the relevant industrial organization scholarship). But see Einer Elhauge, Why
Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory-And the
Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L.J. 681 (2003).
147. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
1653
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
by the end of the Article, once Cover's metaphor of nomos and
narrative is explained in more detail, and its application to antitrust is
discussed more thoroughly. Part III begins that effort.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW NOMOS AND THE CONSUMER WELFARE
NARRATIVE
In Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover set forth a model of
"nomos" and "narrative" in order to describe the ways in which
individuals with different beliefs separate themselves from, yet still
cohabit with, others within a society.51 Through this model, Cover
described how our society had reached a perilous crossroads of
liberty, morality, and adjudication-each of which the Court in Bob
Jones University v. United States had failed properly to address. Part
III.A describes this model in more detail. Part III.B discusses how the
group of conscious parallelism cases could be seen as their own
nomos. Part III.C explains how, following the onset of Chicago
School scholarship, consumer welfare became the dominant part of
the narrative through which certain antitrust scholars and judges
viewed, and indeed attempted to redeem, antitrust law.
A. The Original Nomos and Narrative
In Cover's view, societal cohabitation is a mix of "nomos,"
"narrative," and law. "Nomoi" are the many coexisting sub-groups
within our society, each possessing alternative views of the past and
visions of the future and each interacting with one another as part of
our normative universe.'52 "Narratives" are the understandings of
normative texts and the historical experiences that the individuals
within a nomos share and look to for moral guidance.'53 And, "[l]aw
151. Cover's work built on a rich tradition of scholarship on this subject. See, e.g.,
W.J.T. Mitchell, On Narrative (1981); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982); James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and
Reading Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 415 (1982).
152. Cover, supra note 1. at 9 ("A nomos, as a world of law, entails the application
of human will to an extant state of affairs as well as toward our visions of alternative
futures. A nomos is a present world constituted by a system of tension between
reality and vision."); id at 10 ("[T]he fact that we can locate [our behavior] in a
common 'script' renders it 'sane'-a warrant that we share a nomos.").
153. As Cover states:
A legal tradition is hence part and parcel of a complex normative world.
The tradition includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a
mythos -narratives in which the corpus juris is located by those whose wills
act upon it. These myths establish the paradigms for behavior. They build
relations between the normative and the material universe, between the
constraints of reality and the demands of an ethic.
The codes that relate our normative system to our social constructions of
reality and to our visions of what the world might be are narrative .... To
live in a legal world requires that one know not only the precepts, but also
1654 [Vol. 73
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may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of
a reality to an imagined alternative-that is, as a connective between
two states of affairs, both of which can be represented in their
normative significance only through the devices of narrative. '"154
More specifically, in Cover's model, there are "two corresponding
ideal-typical patterns for combining corpus, discourse, and
interpersonal commitment to form a nomos.''15 5  First, there is a
"world-creating" pattern that he calls the "paideic" because the
individuals share "(1) a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a
common and personal way of being educated into this corpus, and (3)
a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as the individual and
his community work out the implications of their law."' 156  Within a
paideic nomos, individuals possess a strong, "shared sense of a
revealed, transparent normative order." '57 Its creation is a form of
"juridical mitosis. ' 158 Second, there is a "world-maintaining" pattern
that he calls the "imperial," in which "norms are universal and
enforced by institutions," and interpersonal commitments are weak.1
59
This pattern takes hold when the unity of a paideic nomos begins to
collapse, and discord begins to develop, as a way to maintain
coherence. 16°
their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires that
one integrate not only the "is" and the "ought," but the "is," the "ought,"
and the "what might be." Narrative so integrates these domains. Narratives
are models through which we study and experience transformations that
result when a given simplified state of affairs is made to pass through the
force field of a similarly simplified set of norms.
Id. at 9-10. For instance, Cover describes how different Americans may view the
Reconstruction Amendments differently:
All Americans share a national text in the first or thirteenth or fourteenth
amendment, but we do not share an authoritative narrative regarding its
significance. And even were we to share some single authoritative account
of the framing of the text even if we had a national history declared by law
to be authoritative-we could not share the same account relating each of us
as an individual to that history. Some of us would claim Frederick Douglass
as a father, some Abraham Lincoln, and some Jefferson Davis. Choosing
ancestry is a serious business with major implications.
Id. at 17-18.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id. at 12-13.
157. Id. at 14, 16 ("The paideic is an etude on the theme of unity. Its primary
psychological motif is attachment.").
158. Id. at 15.
159. Id. at 13, 16 ("The imperial is an etude on the theme of diversity. Its primary
psychological motif is separation.").
160. See id. at 15. As Cover so eloquently describes:
The diversity of every such world is being consumed from its onset by
domination. Thus, as a meaning in a nomos disintegrates, we seek to rescue
it-to maintain some coherence in the awesome proliferation of meaning
lost as it is created-by unleashing upon the fertile but weakly organized
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Within a nomos, legal meaning has both "insular" and
"redemptive" aspects.161  "Insular" considerations pertain to the
recognition that every nomos, with its shared referents and narrative,
contains its own sub-nomoi whose members possess even greater
normative agreement. Each of these sub-nomoi constitutes a
"separated community" in its own right. Constructed legal meaning
must take account of this "insular autonomy," and respect the various
sub-nomoi's separateness.162  "Redemptive" considerations refer to
the occasion when multiple sub-nomoi within a nomos, potentially of
different size and strength, possess "sharply different visions of the
social order [and thus] require a transformational politics that cannot
be contained within the autonomous insularity of the [sub-nomos]
itself.' 1 63  The point of struggle between the sub-nomos over legal
precept has reached a point that one group's vision must give way to
the other's. Cover calls this sort of transformation "redemptive" to
connote "(1) the unredeemed character of reality as we know it, (2)
the fundamentally different reality that should take its place, and (3)
the replacement of the one with the other. ' ' "6 His main example was
the civil rights movement, which attempted "to liberate persons and
the law and to raise them from a fallen state.' 65
To illustrate "the [c]ompetition [b]etween [i]nsular and
[rledemptive [m]odels,"' 166 Cover contrasted two antislavery variants
before the Civil War. On one hand, the "Garrison abolitionists"
recognized not only the normative abhorrence of slavery, but also the
constitutional protection of it, and therefore sought disengagement
from participation in the state. This "disengagement did not entail
physical or social insularity, but a radical insularity of the normative
world alone." '67 They sought not to "fit[] the Constitution into the
jurisgenerative cells an organizing principle itself incapable of producing the
normative meaning that is life and growth.
Id. at 16; see also id. (describing how, in the United States, "the social organization of
legal precept has approximated the imperial ideal type.. ., while the social
organization of the narratives that imbue those precepts with rich significance has
approximated the paideic").
161. Id. at 10.
162. See, e.g., id. at 26-34; id. at 28 ("The principle that troubled these amici was the
broad assertion that a mere 'public policy,' however admirable, could triumph in the
face of a claim to the first amendment's special shelter against the crisis of
conscience."); id. at 29 (describing how these subgroups "live within the complex
encodings of commitments-their sacred narratives-that ground the understanding
of the law that they offer"); id. ("The principle of separateness is constitutive and
jurisgenerative. It is not only a principle limiting the state, but also one constitutive of
a distinct nomos within the domain left open."); id. at 31 (describing "normative
mitosis").
163. See id. at 34.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 35.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 36.
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definition of a perfectionist community," but to resist and repudiate
the Constitution. 168 On the other hand, the "radical constitutionalists"
such as Frederick Douglass sought to transform the interpretation of
the Constitution such that no amendment was necessary. They
"embrac[ed] a vision-a vision of an alternative world in which the
entire order of American slavery would be without foundation in
law," and attempted through narrative (particularly the guarantee
from the Preamble of the Declaration of Independence to "form a
more perfect union, establish justice, ... and secure the blessings of
liberty' 1 69 and the structure of the Constitution) to alter the existing
interpretations of various constitutional provisions as to hold slavery
unconstitutional. 7 °
These various notions culminated in his criticism of Bob Jones,
which involved the question of whether schools that racially
discriminate on the basis of religious doctrine qualified as tax-exempt
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.171
Section 501(c)(3) stated that organizations would be tax-exempt if
they were "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes."'172
Until 1970, the IRS granted tax-exempt status to private schools under
501(c)(3) without regard to their racial admissions policies, and
granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under
section 170 of the Code.173 In 1971, the IRS introduced Revenue
Ruling 71-447, which stated that both the courts and the IRS have
long recognized that:
[T]he statutory requirement of being "organized and operated
exclusively for the religious, charitable .... or educational purposes"
was intended to express the basic common law concept [of
"charity"] 
....
All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are subject to the
requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or
contrary to public policy.
Based on the "national policy to discourage racial discrimination in
education," the IRS ruled that "a [private] school not having a racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' within the
168. See id. at 36-37.
169. The Declaration of Independence pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
170. See Cover, supra note 1, at 37-40.
171. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1983).
172. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954).
173. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 577-78 & n.2. Section 170(a) allows deductions for
certain "charitable contributions." Section 170(c) defines charitable contribution as a
gift "to or for the use of" an organization "operated exclusively for religious,
charitable,... or educational purposes," effectively tracking § 501(c)( 3 ). Id. at 578
n.2.
174. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
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common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the
Code."'175 The IRS's interpretation of the Code disqualified Bob
Jones University from tax-exempt status because of the University's
discriminatory policies, particularly its disciplinary rules prohibiting
interracial dating and marriage.
176
Bob Jones approved the Ruling as a valid interpretation of
501(c)(3), despite 501(c)(3)'s plain meaning and original intent (its
predecessors were enacted in 1894 when segregation was required by
law), by looking to the statute's overall purpose-holding that its
framers generally intended that tax-exempt entities meet "certain
common-law standards of charity-namely, that [a tax exempt]
institution... must... not be contrary to established public policy." '177
The Court contended that racial discrimination in education violated
"fundamental national public policy," '178 citing Brown v. Board of
Education, civil rights statutes (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964),
and Executive Orders.
179
In Cover's view, the civil rights movement had a redemptive vision
of the social order that required transforming religiously oriented
nomoi. Akin to the radical constitutionalists before the Civil War,
they sought to modify the meaning of the tax-exemption statute to
achieve their vision and impart "imperial virtues."'8 ° On the other
side of the case, Cover viewed the communities supporting Bob Jones
University's ability to discriminate racially on religious grounds as
insular, paideic nomoi that sought to live within our society while
retaining religious freedom.181
Cover lambasted the utter absence of constitutional adjudication.
By reinterpreting the statute, the Court was able to avoid the question
of whether Congress could constitutionally grant tax exemption to a
school that discriminates on the basis of race. Cover viewed this
aspect of the decision as wrong because each side had very real and
very different beliefs about the social order, which the Court's opinion
gave no indication of how to solve:
The Court assumes a position that places nothing at risk and from
which the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all .... The grand
national travail against discrimination is given no normative status in
175. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 579 (quoting Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 231).
176. Id. at 580-81.
177. Id. at 586. To support this statement, the Court looked to nineteenth century
cases involving the charitable law of trusts, such as Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
465, 501 (1861), which stated that a public charitable use must be "consistent with
local laws and public policy." Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 588.
178. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592.
179. Id. at 593-96.
180. Cover, supra note 1, at 60-68.
181. Id. at 64 (describing how the IRS interpretation substantially interfered with
the "nomian insularity of a religious educational institution"); cf id. at 26-33
(discussing how insular communities rightly coexist within a society).
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the Court's opinion, save that it means the IRS was not wrong. The
insular communities, the Mennonites and Amish, are rightly left to
question the scope of the Court's decision: are we at the mercy of
each public policy decision that is not wrong? If the public policy
here has a special status, what is it?...
... The insular communities deserved better-they deserved a
constitutional hedge against mere administration. And the minority
community deserved more-it deserved a constitutional
commitment to avoiding public subsidization of racism.8 2
As did Cover, I do not know how to solve the struggle of civil rights
versus religious freedom. But I believe his thoughts have utility
nonetheless helping to understand the underlying tensions in similar
struggles elsewhere. As I explain in the remainder of this part,
antitrust, for instance, has its nomoi and its narratives too, into which
Cover's work lends insight. In Part III.B, I focus on the "nomos"
element to Cover's work, explaining how conscious parallelism cases
are similar to the insular religious communities and occupy their own
paideic nomos within antitrust. In Part III.C thereafter, I turn to the
role of narrative in the development of the antitrust laws more
generally, comparing the Chicago School of antitrust to the civil rights
movement in Chicagoans' attempt to transform the antitrust laws to
redeem their vision of maximizing consumer welfare. Part III.C
explains in particular that, like the "radical constitutionalists" before
the Civil War and the civil rights proponents in Bob Jones, these
Chicago School scholars sought more than merely to influence the
antitrust laws but to completely eliminate those economic policies and
legal requirements that did not cohere with their vision of the antitrust
laws. The rest of this Article then describes how these components
came together in Matsushita, and the implications thereof.
B. The Conscious Parallelism Nomos
"Conscious parallelism" has no set definition. Most typically,
individuals use the term "conscious parallelism" to describe
oligopolistic price interdependence, which is the process "not in itself
unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect
share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing,
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic
interests." 183 The situation is "interdependent" because each firm's
price is based on the expectation that others will price their product
equally.1" The industry's concentrated nature permits a firm to
182. Id. at 66-67.
183. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227
(1993).
184. There is disagreement in the literature over whether interdependent pricing is
an inherent feature of certain types of concentrated markets. Compare V1 Areeda &
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monitor and react to its competitors' prices.18 Thus, parallel pricing
may result in the oligopoly context even though no agreement exists.
It is commonly considered independent, rather than conspiratorial,
behavior.86
But conscious parallelism can also describe other situations, such as
when an oligopolist contends that his refusal to deal with a firm was
made consciously parallel with other oligopolists (either
independently or interdependently). 87 This behavior is occasionally
allowed because it might be in each firm's independent best interest to
refrain from dealing with that firm. Such was the situation in the
fountainhead conscious parallelism case, Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distributing Corp., in which the Supreme Court in
1954 refused to overturn a jury verdict in favor of the defendants
based solely on evidence of conscious parallelism.188
Part III.B.1 describes the historical antecedents to Theatre
Enterprises as well as that case itself. Part III.B.2 explains how
antitrust and economics scholarship following Theatre Enterprises
portended a change in its meaning, particularly as pertains to the so-
called plus-factor requirement.
1. Theatre Enterprises and Its Antecedents
As is well recognized, "[m]odern judicial efforts to define the
elements of a Section 1 agreement originated in four Supreme Court
decisions issued during a fifteen-year period beginning in 1939 with
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States."'89 It is less well understood,
however, exactly what the cases meant at the time, for in each case the
Court affirmed the district court's rejection of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, creating uncertainty as to the degree to
Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 11 1430-32 (inherent), and Lawrence A. Sullivan, The
Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 835, 858-59
(1987), and Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 665-66 (1962), with
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 42-47 (1976)
[hereinafter Posner, Antitrust Law] (not inherent), and Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly
and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1562, 1566-75 (1969)
[hereinafter Posner, Oligopoly].
185. Prices may remain supracompetitive as an effect because if one firm cuts its
price, the other firms can decrease their price to meet this price cut, thus making
everyone worse off overall (and diminishing the incentive to reduce price initially).
Peter Asch, Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy 41-70 (rev. ed. 1983).
186. See Turner, supra note 184, at 672. Many factors affect the probative value of
parallel pricing, such as whether the product is fungible. E.g., Bendix Corp. v. Balax,
Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that parallel pricing lacks probative
significance when the product is fungible).
187. Turner, supra note 184, at 678.
188. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
189. E.g., Ernest Gellhorn & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics
229 (4th ed. 1989).
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which the scope of these decisions was limited by their procedural
posture. Indeed, one plausible account of the cases from this time
period is that they simply represented broad deference to the original
fact finder.
In Interstate Circuit, the Court upheld the district court's finding
that there was an illegal agreement by movie exhibitors to fix the
prices to be charged for first-run films, for although the government
did not produce any direct evidence of conspiracy, the Court noted
how the inference of conspiracy was justified in the circumstances at
hand given the "substantially unanimous action of the distributors."'9 °
According to the Court:
[It taxed] credulity to believe that the several distributors would, in
the circumstances, have accepted and put into operation with
substantial unanimity such far-reaching changes in their business
methods without some understanding that all were to join, and we
reject as beyond the range of probability that it was the result of
mere chance. 191
In what is arguably dicta, however, the Court went further, stating
how it was not "prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy" that there be
an actual agreement between the parties:
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated
and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and
participated in it.... Acceptance by competitors, without previous
agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
Sherman Act.192
The Court would reiterate such statements several years later in
American Tobacco Co. v. United States193 and United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.94 In American Tobacco, as part of its review
of conspiracy to monopolize charges under section 2, the Court
declared that "[n]o formal agreement is necessary to constitute an
190. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939).
191. Id. at 223; see also VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 1426 ("The
Court's reasoning boiled down to this: the trial judge was entitled to believe that the
distributors exchanged views and coordinated their decisions with each other,
although there was no direct proof.").
192. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226-27. This dicta arguably drew from a prior
decision in which the Court upheld the trial court's finding that retail lumber dealers
had agreed that they would not buy from wholesalers who had sold directly to
consumers in competition with retailers, allowing a conspiracy to be inferred from the
dealers' circulation among their members of lists of offending wholesalers because
"the natural consequence of such action" was for the retailers to withhold their
patronage. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600, 609, 612 (1914).
193. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
194. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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unlawful conspiracy." '195  A finding of conspiracy was justified
"[w]here the circumstances are such as to warrant a jury in finding
that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement. '" 196
And, in Paramount Pictures, involving section 1 and section 2 claims,
the Court described how "[i]t is not necessary to find an express
agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of
action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the
arrangement."19
7
Finally, Theatre Enterprises came in 1954.198 In that case, a plaintiff
suburban Baltimore movie theater sought to show first-run movies,
either exclusively or simultaneously with downtown theaters that had
certain advantages in drawing power and promotion. 99 Rival movie
distributors all denied the plaintiff's request, with each at least
cognizant of the other theaters' refusal as well.20  The plaintiff
claimed that the denials were pursuant to a conspiracy. 201 At the end
of the trial, the case was submitted to a jury, which found no
conspiracy. Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to a
directed verdict of conspiracy due to the parallel nature of the
different theaters' refusal to deal with it. Notably, the Supreme Court
explained:
The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward
petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express. To be sure, business behavior is
admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may
infer agreement. But this Court has never held that proof of parallel
business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased
differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act
offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior
may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude
toward conspiracy; [a footnote to an article by James Rahl] but
''conscious parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the
Sherman Act entirely.20 2
195. Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 809.
196. Id. at 810; see also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275-76
(1942) (holding that a concerted agreement to fix prices existed where several
competitors knowingly made unilateral agreements setting a minimum price with the
same manufacturer, and relying on the dicta from Interstate Circuit).
197. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 142.
198. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
199. Id. at 539-40.
200. See id.; cf. id. at 541 (discussing the "conscious unanimity of action" by the
theaters).
201. Id. at 538.
202. Id. at 540-41 & n.8 (citations omitted). The footnote cited James A. Rahl,
Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 743 (1950). See infra notes 244-46
and accompanying text (describing Rahl's work and the significance of this citation).
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The Court then held that the case was properly submitted to the
jury because genuine factual issues were raised regarding whether
individual business judgment motivated the defendant's conduct.203
As William Kovacic has aptly noted, this group of four cases
established three conceptual points of reference:
First, courts would characterize as concerted action interfirm
coordination realized by means other than a direct exchange of
assurances. Second, courts would allow agreements to be inferred
by circumstantial proof suggesting that the challenged conduct more
likely than not resulted from concerted action. Third, courts would
not find an agreement where the plaintiff showed only that the
defendants recognized their interdependence and simply mimicked
their rivals' pricing moves.20
4
It was uncertain, however, just how far these principles extended
considering that, in each case, the Supreme Court sided with the
district court. For instance, although it was acknowledged that a jury
could infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence that suggested
"that the challenged conduct more likely than not resulted from
concerted action, ,25 it was left completely unanswered whether one
could reasonably infer an agreement from circumstantial proof of
challenged conduct that was equally likely, or less likely than not, to
have resulted from concerted action. Indeed, as John Heninger has
observed, "[n]othing in the Theatre Enterprises opinion suggests that a
plaintiff's verdict returned on evidence of conscious parallelism alone
must be set aside. On the contrary, the Interstate Circuit/Theatre
Enterprises line of cases afforded a fact finder considerable free rein
to infer conspiracies. "206 Or, as one commentator from that era put it,
"judges and juries [were] occasionally . . . convinced by the
explanations, and the Supreme Court [showed] no disposition to
interfere."2
7
203. Theatre Enters., Inc., 346 U.S. at 542.
204. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st
Century, 9 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 97, 100 (1997).
205. Id.
206. John R. Heninger, Note, The Evolving Summary Judgment Standard for
Antitrust Conspiracy Cases, 12 J. Corp. L. 503, 507 (1987) (emphases added); see also
Stephen A. Nye, Can Conduct Oriented Enforcement Inhibit Conscious Parallelism?,
44 A.B.A. Antitrust L.J. 206 (1975). But see VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32,
T 1412(b) ("The noteworthy aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion [in Theatre
Enterprises] was that its tone suggested that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient
even to permit a jury finding of conspiracy, and that tone was very much at odds with
the Court's earlier Interstate Circuit decision.").
207. Robert J. Levy, Some Thoughts on "Antitrust Policy" and the Antitrust
Community, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 963, 979 (1961). As Levy explained, it was also
"infrequent" for appellate courts to reverse a jury verdict on the basis of inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence of parallel conduct. See id. at 979 n.51.
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2. The Change in Theatre Enterprises' Generally Accepted Meaning
But simply to recite that this line of cases supported deference to
the initial fact finder is not to tell the entire story. Over the next few
decades, Theatre Enterprises gradually began to transform from
"delineat[ing] one boundary of the problem: proof of consciously
parallel action does not require a finding that such action is
conspiratorial""2 ° to becoming the predominant citation for the notion
that evidence of consciously parallel behavior was not by itself
sufficient to defeat a defendant's motion of summary judgment.20 9 Or,
as Cover might say, the narrative of conspiracy under section 1
changed in between the two decades before Theatre Enterprises and
the next few decades thereafter, altering the interpretive framework
in which circumstantial evidence of parallel business behavior, and
thus Theatre Enterprises, was considered. Part III.B.2 describes that
narrative progression, and in particular the ways in which different
actors (economists, legal scholars, courts, government entities, etc.)
contributed to its and Theatre Enterprises' corresponding conversion.
a. The Two Decades Before Theatre Enterprises: The Inevitable
Perniciousness of Oligopolies
In the years following the New Deal, courts and scholars began to
accept that "in many oligopolistic markets, fundamental structural
features of the market determine[d] the way in which the market
operate[d], '"21 in particular with how several firms in an oligopoly,
acting interdependently, could exert control over prices and the
market to the detriment of smaller producers. l' With this realization,
the paradigmatic image of conspirators transformed from groups of
men in smoke-filled rooms hammering out an explicit agreement to
sophisticated paramours using subtle and complex signals;2 1 2 and, the
issue transformed from whether government intervention was
required-everybody seemed to agree it was-to the avenue by which
it should proceed: section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act, or
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act.213
208. Bernard R. Sorkin, Conscious Parallelism, 2 Antitrust Bull. 281, 295 (1957).
209. See, e.g., Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847,
1999 WL 691840, at *9 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999); Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United
Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1989).
210. Carl Kaysen, Collusion Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J. Econ. 263, 270 (1951).
211. See M. A. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L.
Rev. 1289, 1304 (1948).
212. See, e.g., Walton Hamilton & Irene Till, Antitrust in Action 15 (photo. reprint
1974) (1940) ("The picture of conspiracy as a meeting by twilight of a trio of sinister
persons with pointed hats close together belongs to a darker age.").
213. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2000) (section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act); 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (section 5 of the FTC Act).
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Following the New Deal, there was increasing disquietude with how
oligopolistic industry structure decreased firm competitiveness.
Prominent scholars, including Arthur Burns214  and Edward
Chamberlin, 215 expounded foundational components of what is now
called "interdependence theory," focusing on how "th[ese] few sellers
[in an oligopoly] instinctively collaborated to maintain the high prices
and low output typical of classic[al] monopolies" through measures
such as price leadership and price following; 216 and, "[1]engthy TNEC
[Temporary National Economic Committee] hearings [in 1940] and
massive studies linked industrial concentration with the business
inertia that foiled fiscal policies to stimulate economic health. 217
These views, "[flor a generation,.., propelled antitrust crusades
against economic concentration, toward an ideal where political and
economic pluralism converged." '218
Unlike prior eras, which focused on bad acts, this post-New Deal
crusade against concentration focused less on the nature of the
oligopolists' actions and more on how the mere existence of few
sellers facilitated interdependent decision making, such as considering
rivals' reactions.219 Indeed, as Chamberlin explained:
214. Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932); Arthur Robert Burns, The Decline of Competition: A Study of the
Evolution of American Industry 1-42, 76-272 (1936).
215. Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A
Re-Orientation of the Theory of Value 30-55 (1933) [hereinafter Chamberlin,
Theory]; E.H.C., Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 44 Q. J. Econ. 63 (1929)
[hereinafter E.H.C., Duopoly]. For one contemporary account that explains "[t]he
renaissance of economic thought initiated by Edward Chamberlin and his
contemporaries [that] has partly rendered obsolete the theories behind antitrust
legislation that was conceived in the earlier era," see Note, Conscious Parallelism-
Fact or Fancy?, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 679 (1951). For a seminal work on
interdependence theory a decade later, see William Fellner, Competition Among the
Few: Oligopoly and Similar Market Structures 3-50, 175-83 (1949). For the
differences between Chamberlin's views and Fellner's views, see Gregory J. Werden,
Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with
Oligopoly Theory, 71 Antitrust L.J. 719, 725-27 (2004).
216. See Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models:
The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511, 1522, 1541-42 & nn.190-
92 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Chamberlin, Theory supra note 215, at 31; E. H.
C., Duopoly, supra note 215, at 65. Rowe calls this the "Oligopoly Model." Rowe,
supra, at 1541-46.
217. Rowe, supra note 216, at 1520-21 & nn.49-56; see also Joseph Bain, Industrial
Concentration and Anti-Trust Policy, in The Growth of the American Economy 616
(Harold Francis Williamson ed., 1951).
218. Rowe, supra note 216, at 1560; see Adelman, supra note 211, at 1304 ("The
underlying idea is that we are dealing with one and only one phenomenon, namely,
control over prices, which is present to some extent everywhere, and excessive degrees
of which may be socially objectionable. A decade ago, such a notion was almost
completely absent from the law.").
219. As Bernard Sorkin, for instance, has explained:
Chamberlin's distinctive contribution to the theory of oligopoly is the
proposition that each such producer, when rational and fully informed, must
take account of his total influence upon the price, indirect as well as direct, if
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Independence of the producers [in an oligopoly] and the pursuit of
their self-interest are not sufficient to lower [the price level]. Only if
the number is large enough to render negligible the effect of an
adjustment by any one upon each of the others is the equilibrium
price the purely competitive one.220
In this light, a noncompetitive price level was seen as unavoidable
in oligopolistic industries.
The inevitability of interdependent considerations by oligopolists
created havoc in ascertaining whether an actual agreement existed-
and, in particular, a non-written one. On the one hand, it was
recognized that noncompetitive price levels were "often the result of
independently pursued self-interest, without collusion of any sort." '221
But, on the other hand, it was grasped that "the more the structure of
a market conduces to restraint, and the fewer and less conspicuous the
necessary collusive measures, the stronger is the drive to use them,
and the harder they are to detect-especially when those 'conspiring'
are (almost) unaware of the fact! ' 2 22 The upshot, at least with respect
to finding an agreement, was threefold. First, the requirements of
what might constitute a conspiratorial agreement were liberalized to
include "independent actions taken in mutual awareness "223 -what
Carl Kaysen famously called an "agreement to agree. ,224 Second,
he is to maximize his profit. From this Chamberlin concluded, a monopoly
price will result.
Sorkin, supra note 208, at 296.
220. Chamberlin, Theory, supra note 215, at 54; see also George W. Stocking &
Myron W. Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 88 (1951) (discussing
Chamberlin's work and influence).
221. Rahl, supra note 202, at 760; id. ("This state of [non-competitive parallelism] is
the result of 'mutual awareness' on the part of the different firms, but it is more like a
stalemate in a contest than a collusive 'concert of action."' (citations omitted)).
222. See Adelman, supra note 211, at 1322.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948)
("It is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to
the arrangement."); cf. Adelman, supra note 211, at 1343 ("In action alleging a price-
fixing combination, there has clearly been a shift of attention from literal collusion to
what might be called the collusive effect of independent actions taken in mutual
awareness."). Or, as James Rahl has put the point:
Blending with the liberalization of evidence has been a somewhat broadened
judicial perception of the mechanics of conspiracy formation. Today, an
industrial conspiracy need not be concluded in a formal compact, negotiated
and solemnized by concurrent exchange of pledges. "Meetings of the
minds" does not require meeting of the bodies. So long as assent to joint
participation is manifest it does not matter how it came about.
Rahl, supra note 202, at 758-59.
224. Kaysen, supra note 210, at 268; see also Michael D. Blechman, Conscious
Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under
the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. Rev. 881, 883 & n.10 (1979) (describing how during
this time "it was suggested that an oligopolist's consciousness of his competitors'
likely reactions to a marketing action could be viewed as a form of agreement and
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because these "agreements to agree" left very little of a paper trail,
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy became relied upon more
heavily. Third, the fact finder's role increased because it had the
ultimate responsibility of sorting through this newly-produced morass
of circumstantial evidence to determine whether such an agreement
existed.225
In addition to those changes, which affected conspiracy charges
under both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act, the specific
effect of the "inevitable perniciousness" concern varied by section due
to the different sorts of behavior addressed by, and remedies of, each
context. Section 1 was concerned primarily with specific
anticompetitive practices, such as the formation of a price-fixing
agreement, and its remedies were directed generally toward stopping
those practices, usually through the issuance of an injunction.226
Section 1 was therefore viewed as a sub-optimal vehicle to remedy the
problem of oligopolistic interdependence both because its perceived
inevitability made it hard to find specific practices to enjoin, and
because the industrial organization and antitrust scholarship of the
time did little to identify specific practices that tended to make an
industry less competitive.2  In this sense, the perceived
perniciousness and the inevitability of oligopolistic interdependence
seemed, at least in theory, to "cancel each other out," and section 1
that in this way, the Sherman Act could be reinterpreted to meet what were perceived
to be new economic realities").
225. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 211, at 1323 ("Elements of control which may
be as effective as they are subtle are built into the market and may operate almost
independent of any conscious joining of policy.... [W]e have no barometers of such
control and few standards by which to distinguish desirable from undesirable
forms."). Consider also the explanation of one contemporaneous commentator:
Since the mere 'fact' of uniformity, without more, cannot rationally give rise
to any one inference in preference to another, it will not be probative by
itself. But an examination of the setting in which the uniformity occurred,
such as the duration and extent of uniformity, the progressiveness of the
industry, and other indicia of competition or the lack of it, may well give rise
to an inference of conspiracy or conscious parallelism.
Note, supra note 215, at 694.
226. See, e.g., Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 184, at 1590-91; cf. Mark R. Patterson,
The Role of Power in the Rule of Reason, 68 Antitrust L.J. 429, 432 (2000) ("But the
focus of the Court in Section 1 cases has always been on conduct rather than
structure ....").
227. As Herbert Hovenkamp has explained:
The monopolistic competition model [by Chamberlin] ... was far more
complicated and made it far more difficult to examine a particular business
practice and proclaim it efficient or inefficient. For example, within that
model product differentiation could increase consumer choice or encourage
innovation; however, it could also be a mechanism by which large firms in
concentrated industries avoided price competition with one another.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 224-25
(1985) (citations omitted).
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cases consequently remained firmly in the hands of the fact finder,
particularly as to whether to infer an "agreement to agree. '
Section 2, conversely, did not suffer from such theoretical problems,
as it was concerned simply with the aggregation of monopoly power.
A fairly common section 2 remedy was divestiture of assets and
dissolution of the firms that comprised the monopoly.29 At least
theoretically, the perceived inevitability of the oligopolistic
interdependence worked in favor of section 2's application because
collaborative inevitability was all the more reason that the drastic
remedy of divestiture and dissolution was required. Following the
Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
("Alcoa")23 in 1945, which involved a one-firm monopoly, the
government immediately turned its attention toward several industries
in which a handful of firms jointly exercised monopoly power via an
alleged conspiracy to monopolize.231  The Supreme Court, in
American Tobacco and Paramount Pictures, quickly endorsed this
application of section 2, leading several prescient scholars, most
famously Eugene Rostow, to prescribe to section 2 a very broad role
in dismantling oligopolistic interdependence.232 But, for practical
228. Appellate courts rarely reversed a jury verdict of conspiracy when the case
was built on circumstantial evidence of parallel business conduct. See, e.g., Levy,
supra note 207, at 979 n.51; cf, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.
1948). But this is not to say that every appellate court upheld lower court findings on
whether there was a conspiracy. In a couple of high-profile cases involving the
motion picture industry, the Third Circuit granted a j.n.o.v., holding that there was a
conspiracy as a matter of law. See William Goldman Theatres Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150
F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945); Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948).
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit in Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th
Cir. 1949), reversed a jury finding that there was a conspiracy, noting that:
In order to justify a jury in finding a verdict of guilty based entirely upon
circumstantial evidence, the facts must not only be consistent with the guilt
of the defendants, and each of the defendants, but they must be inconsistent
with any other reasonable hypothesis that can be predicated upon the
evidence.
Id. at 367 (quoting the district court); see also id. at 368 (discussing how this rule
follows from Chamberlin's work). Other circuits noted the Pevely Dairy approach,
but usually found it less than compelling. See, e.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United
States, 197 F.2d 489, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1952). For a contemporaneous account
discussing how the Pevely Dairy "rule on the use of circumstantial evidence
substitutes the judge for the jury in the process of drawing inferences from the
evidence presented," despite the presence of some circuit court support, see Note,
supra note 215, at 695 & n.83.
229. See, e.g., Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 184, at 1591.
230. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned Hand, J.). For more on how Alcoa
represents a synthesis of prior monopolization doctrine and New Deal concerns with
how existing power advantages perpetuated themselves, see Nickolai G. Levin,
Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 1281 (2003).
231. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Cases and Materials on
Antitrust 128 (1989) (describing how Alcoa marked the beginning of the "structural
consensus" approach to monopolization).
232. See, e.g., May, supra note 13, at 53. In his pathbreaking work, Eugene Rostow
explained how
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reasons, most pertaining to the severity (and costs) of the dissolution
remedy, the application of section 2 to oligopolistic industries
remained limited to a few select targets, such as the tobacco and
motion picture industries.
The most aggressive attempt to curtail parallel business conduct
occurred in the context of section 5 of the FTC Act, a civil statute
which prohibited "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce." 233 In several actions in the late 1940s, the FTC initiated
suits that were based, in part, on the notion that "conscious
parallelism of action" in delivered pricing systems could, without
more, lead to a conspiracy in violation of section 5.234 Of particular
note were the Cement case 235 and the Rigid Steel Conduit case. 236 "The
Cement case was the first attempt by the Commission to strike at
delivered pricing on a theory of conspiracy., 237 Although much of the
evidence pertained to the uniformity of prices and the joint use of a
[t]he new judicial view of monopoly is likely to embrace many market
situations in which effective control of price policy is vested in a small
number of large sellers, whether or not those sellers overtly, conspire
together and whether or not they act to limit the freedom of others to enter
the field.
Eugene Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 567, 576 (1947). He believed the problem was widespread because
[s]uch powers [to raise and lower their prices together] inhere in the few
large sellers who between them produce the dominant fraction of supply.
They are the inevitable economic consequences of size, within the structural
framework of a market which attaches particular strategic importance to
certain elements of control, and sets limits upon the extent to which prices
can safely be raised.
Id. at 586. He thus concluded that "iin all those markets the policy of price and
output which prevails, under the impact of the power of the major companies
operating there, is effectively monopolistic in pattern-every bit as monopolistic as
the policy declared illegal in the Tobacco case." Id. at 587. In a subsequent article,
Rostow explained how
the necessary consequence of the economic organization of the industry is
that the large and dominant sellers, if they have a decent regard for their
own interests, will act as if they had 'combined,' in the sense of the Tobacco
and Paramount cases, although their officers may never have talked to each
other, even on the phone or the golf course.
Eugene Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 Ill. L.
Rev. 745, 783 (1949). Edward Levi also originally espoused similar thoughts in
Edward Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (1947), but
he later became more skeptical in applying section 2 to oligopolies. See Edward Levi,
A Two-Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567 (1952). For other similar
work, see the sources cited in Adelman, supra note 211, at 1305 n.40.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). Both criminal and civil penalties were possible
under the Sherman Act. See id. §§ 1, 2.
234. See, e.g., Sumner S. Kittelle & George P. Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy
Doctrine and Delivered Pricing, 15 Law & Contemp. Probs. 227, 229-35 (1950).
235. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
236. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affid per
curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
237. Kittelle & Lamb, supra note 234, at 230.
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delivered pricing method (with common knowledge of such use),
there was also substantial direct evidence of conspiracy. A violation
was found based on the totality of the evidence.2 38 Similarly, in the
Rigid Steel Conduit case, "the respondents were charged in two
counts, one for conspiracy and the other for the common use, with
common knowledge of such use, of a basing point system." '239 After a
hearing, the Commission "discharged two of the respondents under
the first count, but held them as violators under the second count and
included them in the general cease and desist order.""24 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court later affirmed by an equally
divided court with no opinions filed.24' Although neither of these
cases created firm precedential support for the idea that conscious
parallelism without more could suffice for violations of section 5 of
the FTC Act, each case advanced that argument substantially. In the
Cement case, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that "[w]hile we hold
that the Commission's findings of combination were supported by
evidence, that does not mean that existence of a 'combination' is an
indispensable ingredient of an 'unfair method of competition' under
the Trade Commission Act." '242 In the Rigid Steel Conduit case, the
Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "the second count," which for
some respondents was the only applicable count, "did not rest upon
an agreement or combination." '243
These developments in the FTC Act, however, did not have an
analogous effect on the Sherman Act, for, as James Rahl observed in
1950, the "elevat[ion] [of] parallelism-without-collusion to respectable
status [under the FTC Act] [made] a similar achievement under the
238. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 721-25.
239. Kittelle & Lamb, supra note 234, at 233.
240. Rahl, supra note 202, at 761.
241. Triangle Conduit, 168 F.2d at 181. As Kittelle and Lamb have explained, the
FTC coined the term "conscious parallelism of action" when discussing the Rigid Steel
Conduit case:
It would have been possible to describe this state of facts as a price
conspiracy on the principle that, when a number of enterprises follow a
parallel course of action in the knowledge and contemplation of the fact that
all are acting alike, they have, in effect, formed an agreement. Instead of
phrasing its charge in this way, the Commission chose to rely on the obvious
fact that the economic effect of identical prices achieved through conscious
parallel action is the same as that of similar prices achieved through overt
collusion, and, for this reason, the Commission treated the conscious
parallelism of action as violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Kittelle & Lamb, supra note 234, at 228 (describing an FTC notice to the staff).
242. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 721 n.19 (citing FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257
U.S. 441,455 (1922)).
243. Triangle Conduit, 168 F.2d at 176; see also id. at 179 ("And price uniformity
especially if accompanied by an artificial price level not related to the supply and
demand of a given commodity may be evidence from which an agreement or
understanding, or some concerted action of sellers operating to restrain commerce,
may be inferred.").
1670 [Vol. 73
2005] NOMOS AND NARRATIVE OF MATSUSHITA
Sherman Act more difficult.",2" Indeed, as part of its explanation in
the Cement case, and its description of why section 5 of the FTC Act
applied to the facts at hand, the Court observed that whereas a
conspiracy or combination was required for a violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act,
individual conduct, or concerted conduct, which falls short of being a
Sherman Act violation may as a matter of law constitute an "unfair
method of competition" prohibited by the Trade Commission Act.
A major purpose of that Act, as we have frequently said, was to
enable the Commission to restrain practices as "unfair" which,
although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions would,
most likely do so if left unrestrained.245
As Rahl noted, the "implications" to the Cement and Rigid Steel
Conduit cases were "clear, if tenuous: conspiracy and conscious
parallelism are not legally the same thing... [even if they] may be
from the point of view of economics and public policy.
246
Theatre Enterprises in 1954 seized on this understanding. Citing
Rahl's work in a footnote in the midst of its famous phrase that
"[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have
made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy; [the footnote] but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely," it held that there was not
necessarily a "concert of action" under section 1 of the Sherman Act
even though there was a consciously parallel refusal to deal.247 Thus,
the jury's verdict that no Sherman Act conspiracy existed was
upheld.248 Soon, though, the "conscious parallelism" narrative and
Theatre Enterprises' role within it would begin to change: first, in the
parallel refusal-to-deal context, and second, in other contexts as well.
This Article next focuses on the two decades following Theatre
Enterprises, during which narrative change was restricted to the
parallel refusal-to-deal context. It thereafter discusses how this
narrative change expanded, after that time, into the parallel pricing
context too.
244. Rahl, supra note 202, at 761.
245. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 708.
246. Rahl, supra note 202, at 762.
247. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 &
n.8 (1954).
248. Id. at 542.
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b. The Two Decades After Theatre Enterprises: The Expansion of
Structuralism and Increased Inevitability Concerns Within the
Mainstream; Some Challenges from Chicago Scholars
In the mid-1950s and 1960s, the "structure-conduct-performance"
model of economic analysis became increasingly accepted.24 9 That
was especially so among "Harvard School" theorists who developed a
"no fault monopolization" approach to the problems associated with
oligopolistic interdependence under section 2 of the Sherman Act.250
In "the leading synthesis of antitrust law and economics of its time,"
Kaysen and Turner's Antitrust Policy,251 itself the product of a several
year discussion among several preeminent legal scholars and
economists,252 concluded that "[t]he principal defect of present
antitrust law [was] its inability to cope with market power created by
jointly acting oligopolists, 253 and that dissolution of oligopolistic
industries was necessary even though these oligopolists were not
necessarily guilty of any conduct that violated the Sherman Act. 4 In
subsequent highly influential work on conscious parallelism 255 and
joint monopolization, 256 Turner further detailed the advantages of
using section 2 to address the problem of interdependent pricing
among oligopolists instead of section 1. In particular, he focused on
how section 1 would be ineffective in curtailing interdependent pricing
behavior because there was no practicable way to enjoin an oligopolist
from considering its rivals' reaction when making a pricing decision. 7
249. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement:
Transition Years, 17 Antitrust 61, 61 (Spring 2003). For examples of prominent
scholarship from this time period, see Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (1959), and
Edward S. Mason, Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem (1957).
250. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Review, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 917, 919-20 (2003) (describing Chamberlin, Mason, and Bain as
Harvard economists, and Derek Bok, Areeda, and Turner as Harvard antitrust
scholars, as well as their structuralist approach to monopolization). For a more
detailed exposition on the "no fault monopolization" approach to antitrust, see
Andrew I. Gavil et al., Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in
Competition Policy 603-05 (2002).
251. Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal
Analysis (1959); see Gavil et al., supra note 250, at 604 (describing its preeminence).
252. Kaysen & Turner, supra note 251, at xix n.ll. "[M]embers of the group were
Morris Adelman, Joe Bain, Robert Bishop, Robert Bowie, Kingman Brewster, David
Cavers, Kermit Gordon, Lincoln Gordon, Carl Kaysen, John Linter, Edward Mason
(chairman), Albert Sacks, Donald Trautman, and Donald Turner." Id.
253. Id. at 110.
254. See id. at 110-19; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 250, at 920. Kaysen and
Turner believed that additional legislation was required for although the firms jointly
"possess[ed] substantial degrees of market power," their conduct did not violate the
Sherman Act. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 251, at 110.
255. Turner, supra note 184.
256. Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory
Policies, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1217-31 (1969).
257. Turner, supra note 184, at 669 (explaining how the only way interdependent
pricing could be remedied is through having the courts act like "public-utility
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These proposals by Turner and the other Harvard School theorists
found their most mainstream acceptance in many legislative proposals
of the day, including the White House Task Force Report on
Antitrust Policy (the "Neal Report"). 251
Despite this support for using section 2 to address the problems
associated with oligopolistic interdependence instead of section 1,
litigants continued to bring section 1 claims. In cases involving these
claims, the circuit courts retained their general preference to let the
juries sort out whether the observed parallel behavior resulted from a
conspiracy, including "agreements to agree," or from independent
decision making, especially when the case involved parallel pricing. 9
The main exception, where summary procedures were deemed
appropriate, occurred where the allegation of conspiracy was
implausible in light of all the evidence.2 °  Often citing to Theatre
Enterprises or Cities Service, a vast majority of courts in this period
disposed of alleged parallel refusals on these grounds.261
commissions," which is unreasonable). This remains the dominant view today. As
then-Judge Breyer has previously explained:
Courts have noted that the Sherman Act prohibits agreements, and they
have almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that such individual
pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its own decision upon its belief
that competitors will do the same) do not constitute an unlawful agreement
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. That is not because such pricing is
desirable (it is not), but because it is close to impossible to devise a judicially
enforceable remedy for "interdependent" pricing. How does one order a
firm to set its prices without regard to the likely reactions of its competitors?
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478,484 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer,
J.) (citations omitted).
258. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 37, at 101 & n.1.
259. For examples of cases involving parallel pricing that were allowed to be
submitted to the jury, see Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328 (9th Cir.
1972); Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965); Volasco Products
Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958); Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235
F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956); and National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955)
(discussing the FTC Act). But see Klein v. Am. Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d
Cir. 1963) (not allowing a vertical price-fixing case to be submitted to the jury); Indep.
Iron Works v. U.S. Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1963) (stating how
"[s]imilarity of prices in the sale of standardized products such as the types of steel
involved in this suit will not alone make out a prima facie case of collusive price fixing
in violation of the Sherman Act" as well as the fact that the prices were not actually
uniform). This trend corresponds with the holding in Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1962), that summary procedures were
inappropriate when motive plays a leading role.
260. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
261. For cases involving a horizontal or vertical parallel refusal to deal (at least on
certain terms) where summary procedures were deemed appropriate, see Dahl, Inc. v.
Roy Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1971); Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn
Memorial Gardens, Inc., 404 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd 394 U.S. 700 (1969); Six
Twenty-Nine Productions, Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.
1966); Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d- 874 (1st Cir. 1966);
Naumkeag Theatres Co. v. New England Theatres Inc., 345 F.2d 910, 911-12 (1st Cir.
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Despite the divergence in outcomes, courts rarely explained why
evidence of conscious parallelism was less probative of conspiracy in
the parallel refusal to deal context than in parallel pricing cases.
Rather, they simply intimated that the result was compelled by
precedent. But, two circuits did attempt to provide a slightly more
detailed explanation than the rest. Latching onto some language from
the Ninth Circuit's 1952 opinion in C-O-Two Fire Equipment v. United
States,262 they explained that evidence of plus factors in addition to
evidence of conscious parallelism was required to allow an inference
of conspiracy in the refusal to deal context.2 63 None of these sources,
1965) (holding that the evidence did not support the existence of parallelism); and
Winchester Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 324 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1963). For cases involving a parallel refusal to deal where jury resolution was
appropriate, see Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1958). In the
"middle" was Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), where the Ninth Circuit said that "[c]onscious parallel action
is indeed evidence which, with other evidence, may support a finding of conspiracy.
But standing alone it is not enough," but then found there to be additional evidence
allowing the inference of conspiracy. See id. at 84-85. For cases citing Theatre
Enterprises, see Seagram, 416 F.2d at 85; Ford Motor, 361 F.2d at 880; Naumkeag, 345
F.2d at 912; and Moore, 251 F.2d at 211. For cases citing Cities Service, see Dahl, 448
F.2d at 19; Seagram, 416 F.2d at 85; and Norfolk Monument, 404 F.2d at 1011.
Most interesting was how courts in the parallel pricing context differed in their
reliance on Theatre Enterprises than did courts in the parallel refusal to deal context.
Compare, for instance, the description of the National Lead case (a price-fixing case)
with that of the Ford Motor Co. case (a parallel refusal to deal case). In National
Lead, the court stated that:
While parallel business behavior among competitors is not illegal per se,
[citing Theatre Enterprises] we do not believe the protective mantle of
"conscious parallelism" can clothe with immunity a system employed by
substantially all members of an industry whereby all offer their products for
sale at any given time and at any given point throughout the nation at
identical prices, without regard to differences in shipping costs.
Nat'l Lead Co., 227 F.2d at 834 (citation omitted). In Ford Motor Co., the court said
the following:
At this stage we would be slow to infer a horizontal conspiracy from
evidence of parallelism in this non-price-fixing context. "Conscious
parallelism" in business behavior has not yet been held to be per se
conspiratorial conduct. [Theatre Enterprises.] This record offers nothing
more to suggest a horizontal agreement among dealers.
Ford Motor Co., 361 F.2d at 881 (citation omitted).
262. 197 F.2d 489, 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1952) (describing the trial court's analysis).
263. Naumkeag Theatres, 345 F.2d at 911-12 ("Plaintiff's burden is to show that
there was evidence warranting a finding of something additional from which a
reasonable inference of conspiracy may be made, or, as it puts it, of conscious
parallelism 'plus."'). Additionally, in a case involving a refusal to sell cigarettes to the
plaintiff, the Third Circuit stated:
In other cases utilizing the theory of conscious parallelism to find conspiracy,
at least two of the following three circumstances are present: 'plus' factors
such as those emphasized in the simple refusal to deal cases... parallelism
of a much more elaborate and complex nature; a web of circumstantial
evidence pointing very convincingly to the ultimate fact of agreement.
Del. Valley Marine Supply Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 205 n.19 (3rd Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962) (citations omitted).
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however, provided much guidance in terms of what these plus factors
might be.
In addition, substantial dissent to this perspective of oligopolistic
conduct began to emerge among several scholars later to be
associated with the Chicago School of antitrust, namely George
Stigler, Richard Posner, and Harold Demsetz. 4 Stigler demonstrated
the impediments to the formation and maintenance of cartel
agreements, particularly how cartel members had incentives to try to
undercut one another secretly.265 Posner, in a very famous article266
and subsequent book (the first edition of Antitrust Law2 67 ) built on
Stigler's contributions and argued that oligopolistic interdependence
was not inevitable but rather took many separate, complicit decisions
and thus, without more, qualified as tacit collusion prohibited by
section 1.26' Demsetz explored how large firms were highly profitable
even in unconcentrated industries (likely from efficiencies). 269 These
works, at least by the mid-1970s, served not so much as to create a
coherent position on oligopolistic behavior of their own as to
destabilize the intellectual foundations of the prevalent "Harvard
School" structuralist approach, calling into severe question its ways of
looking at, and often condemning, certain behavior.
264. Professor Thomas Morgan has termed the augmented skepticism about the
Harvard structural approach (which is traditionally associated with the Chicago
School) as the move from the "third" period of antitrust development to the "fourth"
period of antitrust development. See Morgan, supra note 71, at 191-842 (describing
how perspectives about market structure changed between 1940 to 1974 and
thereafter).
265. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44, 45-48 (1964); see
Hovenkamp, supra note 250, at 921 (describing Stigler's article as "groundbreaking").
For other work detailing transaction cost impediments to joint profit maximization,
see Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost
Considerations, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1469-76 (1974).
266. Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 184.
267. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 184,
268. See, e.g., Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 184, at 1566-75; see also Hovenkamp,
supra note 250, at 921 (describing Posner's work and Stigler's influence). Although
Professor Richard Markovits was highly critical of Posner's account of oligopoly, he
too advocated using section 1 of the Sherman Act to attack oligopolistic pricing. See
Richard S. Markovits, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic
Welfare: Part IV, The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligopolistic
Pricing Suits, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 55-60 (1975); Richard S. Markovits, Oligopolistic
Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: Part III, Proving (Illegal)
Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence and a Critique of the
Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 307, 315-19 (1975).
269. Harold Demsetz, Two Structures of Belief About Monopoly, in Industrial
Concentration: The New Learning 166-67 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974);
Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. &
Econ. 1, 7 (1973). For similar criticism of the proposition that concentration leads to
the same poor economic performance as actual agreements, see Yale Brozen,
Concentration and Profits: Does Concentration Matter?, 19 Antitrust Bull. 381, 388
(1974); and Yale Brozen, Concentration and Structural and Market Disequilibria, 16
Antitrust Bull. 241, 248 (1971).
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As this Article explains, the Chicago critiques gained acceptance
over the next thirty years . 711 But, what resulted in conscious
parallelism cases was not so much a "Chicago approach" as a "hybrid"
of the Harvard and Chicago theories, whereby the general view
remained that interdependent pricing was inevitable, but this was
thought not to be worth antitrust concern. Thus, the Harvard view of
the behavior persisted but not the Harvard solution. Instead, the plus-
factor requirement gained hold, which was largely consistent with
many of the Chicago critiques but hardly representative of any
established Chicagoan perspective.
c. The Mid-1970s to Today: The Increasing Acceptance of the Plus-
Factor Requirement
Starting in the mid-1970s, the search for plus factors to distinguish
between conspiratorial and independent behavior gained increasing
acceptance in all types of conscious parallelism cases, including
parallel pricing cases. Although a large part of the expanding use of
plus factors is fairly attributable to Matsushita itself-courts began to
use evidence of plus factors as a way to satisfy Matsushita's "tend to
exclude" requirement-the expansion began much earlier in circuit
court opinions, most prominently in Venzie Corp. v. United States
Mineral Products Co.27' Below, I examine first Venzie and other cases
from the mid-1970s to the 1980s. I then explain how Matsushita
270. As one modern influential textbook has explained:
A catalyzing event took place in 1974 in what came to be known as the
Airlie House Conference. At the Airlie House meeting, critics of
structuralism synthesized a developing literature that challenged the
economic basis for deconcentration. The results of the conference and
related research were widely seen as refuting major elements of structuralist
oligopoly theory and discrediting deconcentration.... [This] indirectly
helped inject Chicago school views into the mainstream of antitrust analysis
and thus helped foster a broader conservative redirection of antitrust.
Gavil et al., supra note 250, at 605 (citation omitted). Federal courts began citing this
Chicago School work in the 1970s, and increasingly in the latter half of the decade.
Westlaw searches as of January 27, 2005, reveal, for instance, that Posner's article,
Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, supra note 184, and
Stigler's article, supra note 265, were only cited once, cumulatively, prior to the end
of 1975, but, since January 1, 1976, Posner's article has been cited fifteen times, and
Stigler's article has been cited seven times.
271. 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975). I focus here only on the circuit courts' adoption
of a plus factors approach. I do this for narrative convenience alone, as historical
evidence indicates that other actors from this period treated oligopolistic behavior
similarly. For instance, the Justice Department adopted a "facilitating practices"
approach to oligopolistic conduct, see Memorandum from John H. Shenefield,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to All Section and Field Office Chiefs
and Senior Litigators, reprinted in 874 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., at F-1 (1978),
which, as commentators at the time noted, involved a straightforward application of
well established legal principles with respect to unreasonable restraints and plus
factors. See, e.g., Milton Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1363, 1417-24
(1978).
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altered the jurisprudential domain as regards the use of plus factors,
especially in oligopoly parallel pricing cases.
272
i. Venzie and Its Immediate Postcursors
Although several earlier cases had stated that a conscious
parallelism plaintiff had to present evidence of parallel business
behavior plus additional evidence (sometimes referred to under the
moniker "plus factors"), it was only in the Third Circuit's 1975
opinion in Venzie (a parallel refusal to deal case) that this approach-
a plus factors approach-really began to develop. As Venzie
explained when describing why summary judgment for the defendant
was appropriate:
[The plaintiffs'] evidence does not, however, include two elements
generally considered critical in establishing conspiracy from
evidence of parallel business behavior: (1) a showing of acts by
defendants in contradiction of their own economic interests [citing
Delaware Valley Marine]; and (2) satisfactory demonstration of a
motivation to enter an agreement [citing Cities Service].
The absence of action contrary to one's economic interest renders
consciously parallel business behavior "meaningless, and in no way
indicates agreement .... " [Citing Turner's article on Conscious
Parallelism.]273
A majority of the circuits soon followed this approach, often citing
to Venzie, including a few price-fixing cases as well as parallel refusal
to deal cases.274 More and more, these courts cited Theatre Enterprises
272. I later describe how some lower courts have potentially overinterpreted
Matsushita's application in parallel pricing cases, effectively requiring too much of
plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage. See infra Part V.
273. Venzie Corp., 521 F.2d at 1314 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 287 (1968); Del. Valley Marine Supply Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d
199 (3d Cir. 1961); Turner, supra note 184, at 681). See generally supra note 263
(describing Del. Valley Marine's explicit use of a plus factors approach). Interestingly
given its historic role, Venzie never uses the term plus factor to describe this
additional evidence.
274. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433, 1437 (5th
Cir. 1984) (vertical price-fixing); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d
128, 139 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1984) (section 5 of the FTC Act; horizontal parallel pricing);
Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1027 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983)
(parallel refusal to sell to plaintiff); Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Ga. Theatre Co., 672
F.2d 485, 494 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982) (parallel refusal to deal); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1201 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1981) (horizontal price-fixing); In
re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) (horizontal price-fixing;
looking to evidence of parallel pricing plus direct evidence of communication between
high-level personnel on pricing policy but not using the moniker plus factors); Weit v.
Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1981) (horizontal
price-fixing); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208
(3d Cir. 1980) (parallel refusal to deal); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 114 (3d Cir. 1980) (vertical price-fixing); Program Eng'g, Inc. v.
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only for the proposition that conscious parallelism is not equal to
conspiracy."'
The reason why courts began to require plus factors tended to vary
by the context. In parallel refusal to deal cases, the plus-factor
requirement became a way to screen out when the inference of
conspiracy was highly implausible in the case at hand because there
were independent business justifications for the parallel decisions
(such as in Theatre Enterprises itself)276 -that is to say,
interdependence played very little, if any, role in the decisions.277 But,
in parallel pricing cases, particularly horizontal ones between
oligopolists, the justification for the plus-factor requirement was not
the implausibility of the conspiratorial inference as much as it was the
non-remediability of the problem (Turner's concern). Indeed, as
then-Judge Breyer explained well:
Courts have noted that the Sherman Act prohibits agreements, and
they have almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that
such individual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its own
decision upon its belief that competitors will do the same) do not
constitute an unlawful agreement under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.... That is not because such pricing is desirable (it is not), but
because it is close to impossible to devise a judicially enforceable
remedy for "interdependent" pricing. How does one order a firm to
Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188, 1195 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980) (parallel refusal to deal);
Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978)
(multiple practices, analogous to a parallel refusal to deal); Gainesville Utils. Dep't v.
Fla. Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1978) (horizontal market division);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977) (parallel refusal to deal);
Modern Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110-11 (2d
Cir. 1975) (parallel refusal to purchase). The First Circuit had already adopted a
"conscious parallelism plus" approach in Naumkeag. See supra note 263.
275. See, e.g., Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 139 ("The mere existence of an oligopolistic
market structure in which a small group of manufacturers engage in consciously
parallel pricing of an identical product does not violate the antitrust laws.") (citing
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954)); Quality
Auto Body, 660 F.2d at 1201 (same).
276. See, e.g., VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, T 1412(b).
277. See Turner, supra note 184, at 681; see also Randall David Marks, Can
Conspiracy Theory Solve the "Oligopoly Problem"?, 45 Md. L. Rev. 387, 406 (1986)
("Despite its lack of discriminative value, the 'against self-interest' factor ... [helps]
screen out cases in which agreement cannot be present."). Or, as Michael Blechman
has explained:
It is relatively easy to say that if this "plus factor" [actions
contrary to one's economic interest] is not present-that is, if
each firm would act in a given way regardless of whether its
competitors acted in the same way-then the defendants'
actions are independent and no agreement may be inferred.
That would be the case, for example, where each of several
suppliers has its own legitimate business reason for not dealing
with a particular customer.
Blechman, supra note 224, at 897. For more modern reasoning on this point, see VI
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 91 1412(d), 1413(b).
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set its prices without regard to the likely reactions of its
competitors?
27
Nevertheless, in both types of cases-parallel refusals to deal and
parallel pricing-this imposition of a plus-factor requirement
coincided nicely with the general non-interventionist approach of
most Chicago School scholars. 9
278. Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988)
(citing several cases, including Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-54 (2d Cir.
1987)). Notably, in Clamp-All Corp., then-Judge Breyer does not justify this
requirement via Monsanto or Matsushita or implausibility concerns. See Apex Oil Co.,
822 F.2d at 253-54. Apex Oil does, to be sure, cite Monsanto and Matsushita, but it
explicitly dismisses their concerns with implausibility in the horizontal price-fixing
context; rather, Apex Oil rests its logic on the Modern Home case and In re Plywood
Antitrust Litigation. See id. at 253-54. Interestingly, during this time, evidence of
interdependent decision making became much more probative of conspiracy in the
parallel refusal to deal context than in the parallel pricing context. Compare id. at 253
(describing how proof of interdependent pricing among oligopolists did not suffice to
raise an inference of a tacit agreement), with Modern Home, 513 F.2d at 110
(discussing how proof that the decisions were interdependent would have sufficed to
"raise the inference of a tacit agreement to boycott"). There are two reasons for this
divergence, one logical and one practical, both related to Turner. The logical reason
was that interdependent oligopolist pricing better fit with "competitive norms" than
interdependent decisions not to deal with a firm. Thus, interdependent pricing was
more likely to result from seriatim pricing decisions by firms that merely took rivals'
likely reactions into its decision-making calculus, which were allowed, as opposed to
"agreements to agree," which were not. See Turner, supra note 184, at 662-66, 682,
684-704; cf. Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 447 (discussing how interdependent pricing is not
necessarily related to collusion). The practical reason was that the Areeda & Turner
treatise on antitrust law debuted in 1978, reproducing many of the arguments from
Turner's prior work. See, e.g., II Philip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law
404(b)(1) (1978) (discussing why interdependent pricing among oligopolists was not
probative of conspiracy). Many individuals relied on this treatise as an accurate
statement of antitrust law. Another way to think of the difference, at least
descriptively, is that parallel refusals to deal tended to be seen as being either
concerted or completely independent. Thus, while courts were still predisposed to
grant judgment in favor of the defendant when there was an independent decision for
the refusal, they viewed "interdependent" decisions much more suspiciously. See
Modern Home, 513 F.2d at 111. By contrast, courts adopted a much more nuanced
view of parallel pricing. On the one hand, it was recognized that parallel pricing may
have resulted simply from parallel cost structures and product qualities. See, e.g., Weit,
641 F.2d at 462-63; Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir. 1972). On
the other hand, courts and commentators were also cognizant, due largely to Turner's
work, of how seriatim independent decisions, where each firm decided merely to be a
price leader or a price follower, could also create a pricing equilibrium. See, e.g., VI
Philip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law, 1425(d) (1986) (published Nov. 8, 1985)
(describing how sequential parallelism could create a pricing equilibrium). Both of
these outcomes were typically distinguished from a situation where there was a set
agreement as to who would be a price leader and price follower and thus no
independent decision making at all. See, e.g., id. 1402(b)(3).
279. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 98, at 178-197. As described above, Posner was
more skeptical of interdependent pricing than many of his Chicago School
contemporaries. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text. Posner's view, while
accepted by economists, was not very accepted by the courts. See Marks, supra note
277, at 399. This may very well be the result, in part, of an "historical accident: the
Turner view won acceptance first." Id. at 400.
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The main difference among the circuit courts concerned exactly
how plausible the inference of conspiracy had to be relative to that of
independent conduct. The main view appeared to be that "when a
plaintiff firm does show common action plus an appropriate 'plus
factor' which may rationally indicate that defendants have expressly
or impliedly committed themselves to a common course of action,
it... earns its way to the jury."28 The First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
adopted this standard explicitly,281 while other circuits did so implicitly
(by not addressing the level of proof required at the summary
judgment stage while prior precedents indicated that the inference of
conspiracy need only be reasonable).282 The Third, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits, however, indicated that the inference of conspiracy
need be more attractive than that of independent behavior for the
case to be submitted to the jury.283 But, even this difference was
slightly illusory given that some courts applying a higher standard
viewed the successful showing that a plus factor existed as sufficient,284
280. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 319 (1977).
281. See, e.g., Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 709 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir.
1983) ("Thus, in a case like the one before us, a plaintiff cannot overcome a motion
for summary judgment without alleging sufficient facts to raise a reasonable inference
of an illegal combination or conspiracy."); Southway Theatres v. Ca. Theater Co., 672
F.2d 485, 415 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) ("The ultimate inference that a conspiracy
existed need not be more probable than the inference that the refusal to deal resulted
from independent business judgment."); Naumkeag Theatres Co. v. New England
Theatres, Inc., 345 F.2d 910, 911-12 (1st Cir. 1965) ("Plaintiff's burden is to show that
there was evidence warranting a finding of something additional from which a
reasonable inference of conspiracy may be made, or, as it puts it, of conscious
parallelism 'plus."').
282. See, e.g., Wilder Enter., Inc. v. Allied Artists Picture Corp., 632 F.2d 1135,
1139 (4th Cir. 1980); Pennington v. United Mine Workers of Am., 325 F.2d 804, 811
(6th Cir. 1963); Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 176 F.2d 594, 596-97
(2d Cir. 1949).
283. See, e.g., Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 463
(7th Cir. 1981) ("[W]hen the plaintiff.., relies on circumstantial evidence alone, the
inference of unlawful agreement rather than individual business judgment must be the
compelling, if not exclusive, rational inference.") (citing Pevely Dairy Co. v. United
States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), which as I describe supra note 228, was anomalous
for its time); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th
Cir. 1978) ("An inference of conspiracy is not warranted where the conduct is at least
as consistent with legitimate business decisions by the distributor as with the planned
exclusion of the plaintiffs."); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir.
1977) ("[P]roof of consciously parallel business behavior is circumstantial evidence
from which an agreement, tacit or express, can be inferred but that such evidence,
without more, is insufficient unless the circumstances under which it occurred make
the inference of rational, independent choice less attractive than that of concerted
action."). But see Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733,
743 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he elements of a conspiracy are rarely established through
means other than circumstantial evidence, and summary judgment is only warranted
when 'the evidence is so onesided as to leave no room for any reasonable difference
of opinion as to how the case should be decided."' (citations omitted)).
284. See, e.g., Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 446.
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which was ultimately all that the remaining decisions of the time
seemed to demand as well.
Left unanswered, however, was a pivotal question: Exactly how
convinced did a court have to be that a plus factor existed as to allow
the case to be submitted to the jury? That is to say, the ultimate
inference at issue was whether one could infer a conspiracy, and for
that ultimate inference courts required evidence of conscious
parallelism and plus factors, and would allow a case to be submitted
when plus factors were "established." But that rule begged the
question of what it took to establish a plus factor in the first place, as
often the evidence establishing those plus factors, such as actions
against self-interest, was circumstantial as well. Hence, establishing
the existence of a plus factor required an inference too. It was only
after Matsushita was decided that courts began to address what it took
to establish the existence of a plus factor in the first place.
ii. Monsanto and Matsushita's Influence on Conscious Parallelism
Cases
Following Monsanto and Matsushita, the plus-factor requirement, as
espoused in conscious parallelism cases and commentary (namely the
Areeda treatise), developed as follows.285 First, the number of factors
recognized as plus factors increased from motive to behave
collectively, acts against self-interest unless pursued collectively, and
high levels of interfirm communication to those three as well as
"market conduct that appears irrational absent agreement," "past
history of industry collaboration," "facilitating practices," "industry
structure" (including market structure and product and purchaser
information), and "industry performance. ''286 Second, the existing
plus factors became more refined: For instance, "high-level of
interfirm communication" became a high level of information
exchange that "had an impact on pricing decisions. 2 87 Third, courts
began explicitly differentiating between the value of different plus
factors, as some were seen as necessary for a finding of conspiracy,
whereas others were sufficient for such a finding.288 Fourth, courts
285. For a more detailed description of particular recent cases, see Werden, supra
note 215, at 753-59.
286. See, e.g., Gavil et al., supra note 250, at 283.
287. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1034
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 125
(3d Cir. 1999)).
288. See, e.g., VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 1412. Or, as Judge
Gibson put the point in his Blomkest dissent:
With Monsanto in mind, it is useful to distinguish between "plus factors"
that establish a background making conspiracy [more] likely and "plus
factors" that tend to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted
without agreement. For instance, "motive to conspire" and "high level of
interfirm communications," are often cited as "plus factors" that tend to
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have turned their scrutiny to the requisite plausibility of the existence
of a plus factor in the first place, often requiring circumstantial
evidence that must "tend to exclude the possibility of independent
behavior" to constitute a plus factor in the first place.
289
The third and fourth changes were especially significant in oligopoly
parallel pricing cases. The third change was significant because the
existence of certain plus factors such as "industry structure" and
motive to conspire followed directly from the oligopolistic market
structure and the incentives for joint pricing therein. Hence, the
conclusion that these plus factors were only necessary shifted focus to
whether the plaintiff had set forth sufficient evidence of other plus
factors, such as actions against self-interest, which is often more
difficult to prove. But this is exactly why the fourth change became
especially pernicious for plaintiffs: Whereas conspiracy is hard to
prove, "mere interdependence" is hard to disprove; because a firm
exclude the possibility that the defendants acted without agreement. For
instance, "motive to conspire" and "high level of interfirm communications,"
are often cited as "plus factors" because they make conspiracy possible.
Background facts showing a situation conducive to collusion do not tend to
exclude the possibility of independent action, but they nevertheless form an
essential foundation for a circumstantial case. In [Matsushita], the Supreme
Court held that a conspiracy case based on circumstantial evidence must be
economically plausible. The background "plus factors" of market structure,
motivation and opportunity play an important role in establishing such
plausibility. Generally, these background "plus factors" are necessary but
not sufficient to prove conspiracy.
On the other hand, acts that would be irrational or contrary to the
defendant's economic interest if no conspiracy existed, but which would be
rational if the alleged agreement existed, do tend to exclude the possibility
of innocence.
Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1043-44 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Most
courts have found actions contrary to self-interest to be sufficient. See, e.g.,
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris, USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003) ("It is
firmly established that actions that are contrary to an actor's economic interest
constitute a plus factor that is sufficient to satisfy a price fixing plaintiff's burden in
opposing a summary judgment motion."); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173
F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[Actions against self-interest will consistently] tend to
exclude the possibility of independent conduct."); Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC
v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *10 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999)
("Evidence of acts contrary to an alleged conspirator's economic interest is perhaps
the strongest plus factor indicative of a conspiracy."). But see In re Flat Glass
Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an "action against
self-interest" is not a "sufficient" plus factor, arguing that actions against self-interest
arise from merely interdependent behavior as well). Three examples of actions that
are normally against self-interest are: "(a) the disclosure of otherwise confidential
pricing information, (b) the uniform adoption of marketwide standard terms of sale,
and (c) adherence by all firms in the market to a standard pricing policy contrary to
market conditions." Thomas A. Piriano, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 9, 54 (2004).
289. See, e.g., Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1311; VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra
note 32, 1415(d) (describing how a business action must not only seem to be against
self-interest but so compellingly against their self-interest as to make the inference of
independent action implausible and citing cases).
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may be acting toward an interdependent interest, 29° raising the level of
proof required to establish an action against self-interest has, in many
cases, effectively shielded defendants from liability for oligopoly
parallel pricing.291
While some of these changes might simply be an indication of the
natural refinement of the plus-factor requirement as courts become
more comfortable with it,29 2 the overwhelmingly preponderant
justification for these changes has to be seen as Monsanto and
Matsushita's "tends to exclude" standard itself, for it was precisely this
plus-factor evidence that usually provided that additional something
that allowed the court to conclude that the evidence "tends to
exclude" the possibility of independent conduct.293 This is especially
so with respect to the third and fourth changes listed above, as almost
every decision concluding either that (1) a plus factor has not been
established or (2) that a plus factor has been established but is not
sufficient to present a submissible case, have done so in the context of
explaining why the "tends to exclude" standard has not been met.
Highly illustrative is the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in
Williamson Oil,294 an oligopoly parallel pricing case involving several
tobacco companies. There, after citing how Monsanto and Matsushita
require evidence "'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the
alleged conspirators acted independently,, 29 the court explained how
to present a submissible case: a plaintiff had to demonstrate the
"existence of one or more 'plus factors' that 'tends to exclude the
290. See VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 1415(e).
291. See infra Part V.
292. Cf. VI Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 32, 1410. Areeda explained that:
Although the line between coordination through recognized
interdependence and some commitment is shadowy, the distinction is
important so long as antitrust law allows the former but condemns the latter.
Furthermore, unless we can see a rational mental process by which a judge
or jury can move from an observed fact-say, price leadership-to a
conclusion of "conspiracy" or "no conspiracy," the case must be resolved by
rules of law allocating burdens of proof or creating presumptions that certain
behavior will-or will not-be treated as an agreement.
Id.
293. See, e.g., Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d
1224, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing how it is only when plus factors are present
"that the evidence 'tends to exclude the possibility that [the defendants] [acted]
independently"') (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 304 (3d Cir. 1983));
see also Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1033. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit altered its position after
Monsanto: Before Monsanto, the inference of conspiracy needed only to be
reasonable in light of the evidence. See Southway Theatres Inc. v. Georgia Theatre
Co., 672 F.2d 485, 495 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). But, after Monsanto, the evidence of
conspiracy needed to "tend to exclude" the possibility of independent conduct. See
Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433, 1438 (5th Cir. 1984)
(citing Monsanto).
294. Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1287.
295. Id. at 1300 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 588 (1986)).
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possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently.' 29 6
And, later in the opinion, the court explained how, because of
Monsanto and Matsushita, the inference that a plus factor existed in
the first place had to be more plausible than the inference than it did
not; describing the action versus self-interest plus factor, the court
said:
[W]e must exercise prudence in labeling a given action as being
contrary to the actor's economic interests, lest we be too quick to
second-guess well-intentioned business judgments of all kinds.
Accordingly, appellants must show more than that a particular
action did not ultimately work to a manufacturer's financial
advantage. Instead, in the terms employed by Matsushita, the action
must "tend[] to exclude the possibility of independent action."
Thus, if a benign explanation for the action is equally or more
plausible than a collusive explanation, the action cannot constitute a
plus factor. Equipoise is not enough to take the case to the jury.297
In Part V, I explain why this arguably represents a misreading of
Matsushita, but here it is worth pointing out that the Eleventh Circuit
does not seem to be alone in requiring a higher level of proof to
establish the existence of a plus factor.2 98 Most of the other circuits
appear, at least implicitly, to agree.299 Indeed, the only circuit to take
a directly contrary position appears to be the Seventh Circuit, where a
decision authored by Judge Posner holds that additional evidence of
conspiracy is required at the summary judgment stage only when the
plaintiff's theory makes no economic sense.3"0
C. The Consumer Welfare Narrative
While this change occurred in the conscious parallelism nomos, a
broader transformation transpired in the antitrust laws more
generally, particularly a narrowing of the liability rules, as augmenting
"consumer welfare" became an increasingly important part of
antitrust analysis in the late 1970s and 1980s. Part III.C.1 briefly
describes that change, while Part III.C.2 turns to its consequent
296. Id. at 1301.
297. Id. at 1310 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
298. Piriano, supra note 288, at 28 ("Lower federal courts have decided simply to
grant summary judgment to defendants when the evidence of conspiracy is evenly
balanced, or is ambiguous."); id. (citing Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1035, 1051, as an
example).
299. See, e.g., In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Baby
Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 133 (3d Cir. 1999). My standard for leaving the
question unaddressed is stating the plus-factor requirement without elaborating on
what is required to establish it in the first place.
300. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir.
2002). Judge Posner has taken this view extrajudicially as well. See, e.g., Posner, supra
note 37, at 69-100.
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ramifications for evidentiary rules as manifested in Monsanto and
Matsushita.3"1
1. The Narrowing of Liability Rules Due to Consumer Welfare
Concerns
The narrowing of liability rules is primarily exhibited in the
movement away from per se liability (illegal once identified), and
toward a more open-ended and permissive inquiry, in many different
types of antitrust suits. By 1967, for instance, per se rules applied to
horizontal price-fixing conspiracies,3 °2 concerted refusals to deal,3"3
vertical price-fixing conspiracies,30 4 vertical non-price restraints,0 and
tying arrangements.3 6 Even without any showing of actual market
power, courts were willing to presume the behavior's anticompetitive
effect. But by 1986, the situation was vastly different.3 7 In certain
areas of law, per se rules still applied but the circumstances in which
they did had been lessened greatly. Horizontal agreements that
literally fixed prices were not per se illegal if the "[purpose and effects
of the agreement] facially appear[ed] to be one that would [not]
always or almost always tend to restrict competition,""3 or if the
restraint is "essential if the product is to be available at all."30 9 In
concerted refusal to deal cases, the Court required the threshold
determination whether the "concerted activity [is] characteristically
likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects" or if it is
designed to make markets more competitive before applying per se
301. Standing requirements also become more stringent, particularly the
requirement that plaintiffs prove "antitrust injury," see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), and the barring of suits by indirect purchasers,
see Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Although these standing requirements
are vastly important, I do not focus on them here.
302. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
303. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
304. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
305. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
306. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
307. I use 1986 here because it is the year of Matsushita. More diminishments to
per se liability also occurred after Matsushita, both in terms of the development of the
quick-look doctrine, see FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), and in
relation to vertical price-fixing conspiracies, see Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
308. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)
(excepting a "blanket license" from per se treatment because of its design to render
markets more competitive). The Court there described how the term "price fixing,"
as warrants per se liability, is a "term of art" that applies only after considerable
judicial experience with a type of arrangement. Id. at 9.
309. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (applying the rule of reason to an agreement between the NCAA
and member institutions for televising college football games).
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liability.31° In tying cases, the per se rule only applied if the defendant
possessed a significant share of the tying product market.311 But in
other areas of the law, namely vertical non-price restraints, per se
condemnation was eliminated altogether in favor of analysis under the
rule of reason (where the restraint would be allowed if reasonable). 312
In each of these situations, the change from per se rules was largely
motivated by concerns for "consumer welfare" and its common
pseudonym "economic efficiency."3 3  This is especially clear with
respect to Sylvania and the Court's decision to analyze vertical non-
price restraints under the rule of reason. There, in reversing
application of the per se rule, the Court explained how vertical
arrangements that reduce intrabrand competition might enhance
interbrand competition through helping the manufacturer achieve
certain distributional efficiencies (such as inducing retailers to invest
labor and capital in unknown products, to provide promotional
activities, to provide service and repair, and to control freeriders);314
and that interbrand competition is the primary concern of the
antitrust laws. 315 The Court did not deem the reduction in intrabrand
310. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 295 (1985).
311. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); see also Donald L. Beschle,
"What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny As an Alternative to Per Se
Antitrust Illegality, 38 Hastings L.J. 471, 495-96 (1987) ("Cases involving tying
arrangements have followed the general pattern of retaining the black letter rule of
per se illegality while at the same time narrowing the scope of activity subject to the
rule.").
312. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
313. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294 (describing past
group boycotts that were per se illegal: "[T]he practices were generally not justified
by plausible arguments that they were intended to enhance overall efficiency and
make markets more competitive"), NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 ("But whether the
ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the
essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances
competition."). The Jefferson Parish case stated:
And from the standpoint of the consumer whose interests the statute was
especially intended to serve the freedom to select the best bargain in the
second market is impaired by his need to purchase the tying product, and
perhaps by an inability to evaluate the true cost of either product when they
are available only as a package.
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15; id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The time has
therefore come to abandon the 'per se' label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse
economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have."); BMI,
441 U.S. at 20 (describing how although the blanket licenses fixed price they were
"designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less,
competitive"') (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978)). But see William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221,
1237-38, 1253-57 (1989) (arguing that the Court has refused fully to embrace
consumer welfare as the exclusive goal of antitrust).
314. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55.
315. Id. at 52 n.19.
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competition a problem because interbrand competition "provides a
significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power
because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of
the same product." '316 Rule of reason analysis was appropriate
because only then would courts be able to assess the "relevant
economic impact." '317
These increased concerns with "consumer welfare" and economic
efficiency were largely, but not entirely, in response to Chicago School
scholarship,3"8 which tended to view economic efficiency as the main,
if not sole, goal of the antitrust laws.319 Indeed, in Sylvania, the Court
relied heavily on Robert Bork's32 ° and Posner's3 21 work (as well as
many other scholars) in discussing the "free-rider effect" and other
competitive benefits to vertical non-price restraints, justifying the rule
of reason approach to analyzing those restraints.322 In later cases
cutting back on per se condemnation, this shift in Sylvania served as
an important conceptual lodestar, as these courts would point to
Sylvania as undercutting, if not displacing, prior assumptions.32 3 Thus,
316. Id.
317. Id. at 56.
318. See, e.g., Gellhorn & Kovacic, supra note 189, at 156-222; Thomas A. Piriano,
Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 685, 685-99 (1991). A critical reason why the Supreme Court accepted
this scholarship in 1977, although resisting some of its conclusions previously, was the
appointment by President Nixon of Justices amenable to that theory (Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist). Cf. infra note 326 (discussing some of these
Justices' concern with how loose evidentiary rules potentially contributed to the
existence of nuisance-value settlements).
319. See, e.g., Page, supra note 313, at 1243; see also Piriano, supra note 288, at 14
n.26 (discussing how Chicago School adherents "argue that antitrust enforcement
should be concerned only with protecting consumers from the overcharging that can
occur when firms gain an amount of market power that allows them to artificially
restrain output" and that "antitrust policy need not consider social goals unrelated to
such abuses of market power, such as the protection of small businesses or the
fairness of the competitive process"). Chicagoans' analysis focused mainly on alleged
exclusionary conduct. They tended to prefer per se legality for practices such as
resale price maintenance, predatory pricing, and tying arrangements, see Judson,
supra note 127, at 1242, and favored "little other than prosecuting plain vanilla cartels
and mergers to monopoly." Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1701 (1986). To say that Chicago scholars have not gotten all they
wanted is not to negate that they have caused a substantial change in antitrust law.
Indeed, the whole point of Cover's work is that there are conflicting concerns that
must be reconciled to serve as legitimate sources of authority. Thus, Chicago's
inability to reform the antitrust laws completely is, to a degree, proof that there is a
nomotic-narrative conflict deserving recognition.
320. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
the Market Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966).
321. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 282 (1975).
322. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48-56 & nn.13-24.
323. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
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although these cases did not adopt a rule of reason approach
entirely,3 24 the redemptive features of Sylvania and the Chicago
scholarship it relied upon was apparent.
2. The Consequent Ramifications for Evidentiary Rules, Particularly
Summary Judgment3
25
The Court's concern with "consumer welfare" did not end with
narrowed liability rules. Consumer welfare considerations affected
the development of evidentiary rules too, especially in those contexts
where per se liability would attach once the fact finder found an
agreement. In particular, the Court became cognizant of how
"lenient" evidentiary rules, which allowed an agreement to be
inferred from certain observable business behavior, could cause firms
to forego that behavior, even if it was actually part of a
procompetitive course of conduct. "Stricter" evidentiary rules,
including restrictions on when an agreement could permissibly be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, were therefore needed to
reduce the risk that procompetitive conduct would be deterred.326
9 n.l (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 13 n.24, 20
(1979). For a more contemporary view on Sylvania's implications, see Richard A.
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1977); and Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979). In Jefferson Parish, however, the
Court justified its "market power" prerequisite in terms of "leveraging," a problem
that had been described by Areeda and Turner. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14
n.20 (citing V Philip Areeda & Donald Turner, Antitrust Law 1134(a), at 202
(1980)); see also id. at 22 n.35. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish
more closely tracks a Chicago School "consumer welfare" approach. See, e.g.. id. at 39
n.9 (citing Ward Bowman, among others, for the "single monopoly profit" theory).
324. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16 (requiring certain threshold factors to
be established before the per se rule against tying arrangement applies); BMI, 441
U.S. at 9 (looking to the history and effect of a restraint that literally fixes prices
before the per se rule against price-fixing applies).
325. See generally Calkins, supra note 122 (discussing the equilibrating tendencies
of summary judgment, treble damages, and substantive developments in antitrust
law).
326. Another contemporary concern was that loose evidentiary rules helped
plaintiffs bring frivolous claims solely to extort a "nuisance settlement." See, e.g.,
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979) ("District courts must be especially
alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements; they have
broad power and discretion vested in them by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 with respect to
matters involving the certification and management of potentially cumbersome or
frivolous class actions."); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819-20 n.35 (1982)
("Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of government as contemplated
by our constitutional structure, and 'firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' is fully warranted in such cases." (citation omitted)); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 180 n.4 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In some instances, it might be
appropriate for the district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope
that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other developments in
discovery might reduce the need for the material demanded."); ACF Indus., Inc. v.
EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1086-88 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
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Monsanto is illustrative. At issue, as described above, was whether
a conspiracy could be inferred from evidence of a termination of a
price-cutter, when that termination might have been unilateral
conduct, which was permitted by Colgate, or part of a resale price
maintenance conspiracy, which was per se illegal under Dr. Miles.327
Recognizing that Colgate-permitted terminations could be used to
enforce a procompetitive non-price restraint protected by Sylvania,
and that no manufacturer would adopt such a non-price restraint if it
risked treble damages in ensuring its compliance,328 the Court adopted
the "tends to exclude" standard, noting that it was necessary to limit
the range of permissible inferences from the ambiguous evidence of
termination to prevent procompetitive conduct from being deterred.329
Matsushita represented an extension of the same sort of concern, as
the Court there limited inferences as a way to protect price-cutting
conduct, which unlike the vertical non-price restraints in Sylvania that
were merely checked by interbrand competition,330 was the "essence"
of interbrand competition itself.331 In Matsushita, the Court noted
how predatory pricing conspiracies were substantively disfavored in
much of the scholarship and the lower courts, as they were self-
deterring because of the implausibility of recouping lost profits.332 In
(commenting upon how widespread discovery abuse has become a prime cause of
delay and expense in civil litigation). Indeed, "[p]olling data demonstrates clearly
that the popular perception of the character and the ethics of American lawyers, and
the prestige of the profession, have plunged precipitously since the 1970s." Michael
Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 Nova L. Rev. 533, 536 (2000). The existence
of discovery abuses and claims brought solely to extort a nuisance-value settlement
surely contributed to this growing public distrust of lawyers.
327. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
328. As Monsanto explained:
[I]t is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a
particular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often costly
nonprice restrictions that it will have the most interest in the distributors'
resale prices. The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its
distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and
training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of the
product, and will want to see that "freeriders" do not interfere.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,762-63 (1984).
329. Id. at 763. Similar concerns arose in the Fortner remand in 1977. See United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S 610 (1977). Although the
defendants' unique credit arrangement was once the basis for a reversal of a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants (because it purportedly was a fact-
based issue whether it led to market power over the provision of credit), see Fortner
Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 506 (1969), the Court remarked
in 1977 that it led to no inference of market power over the provision of credit
whatsoever. Fortner, 429 U.S. at 621-23. For more on Fortner, see supra notes 66-71
and accompanying text.
330. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
331. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
332. Id. at 594-95 (citing Barry Wright Corp. v. IT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,
234 (1st Cir. 1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1,
26 (1984)); see also Bork, supra note 98, at 149-55 (contending that predatory pricing
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this context, the Court deemed mistaken inferences "especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
protect." '333  Balanced against the concern of not punishing an
implausible conspiracy, the Matsushita Court's deterrence concerns
were substantially, "unusually," greater.334 Limiting the range of
permissible inferences helped the Court encourage future low prices.
But Matsushita did not answer all the relevant deterrence-related
questions; some things still needed clarification. After Matsushita, for
instance, it was unclear just how often the observable business
behavior had to be procompetitive to "trigger" inference limitation,
for while the Matsushita opinion described the "unusualness" of the
predatory pricing situation, it never provided a lower
"procompetitiveness" bound on when deterrence concerns were
applicable.335
Kodak, however, did. As the Court explained in that decision,
deterrence concerns did not apply when the alleged behavior merely
was generally more procompetitive than anticompetitive: "We need
not decide whether Kodak's behavior has any procompetitive effects
and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
33 6
Rather, the Court stated that deterrence concerns only required
inference limitation when the observed behavior was almost
invariably more procompetitive than anticompetitive, "one that
appears always or almost always to enhance competition." '337 Thus, as
Figure A demonstrates below, envisioning a procompetitiveness
spectrum based on how frequently the observed behavior appeared to
enhance competition, and only providing protection to that conduct at
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful); Easterbrook, supra note
98, at 268 (same). The Court would expand on predatory pricing's inherent
implausibility in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993).
333. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 594. The Court went on to quote
Barry Wright Corp.: "[We] must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes
a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging
legitimate price competition." Id.
334. Id.
335. Herbert Hovenkamp has put the point well:
Matsushita spoke in the context of a highly improbable twenty-year-long
predatory pricing conspiracy and required high-quality evidence to permit
such a conspiracy to be presented to a jury.... However, Matsushita itself
said little about proof requirements in a case where underlying structural
evidence indicates that the offense is quite plausible and would be profitable
for the defendants.
Hovenkamp, supra note 250, at 925-26.
336. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,479 (1992).
337. Id. This "always or almost always" language paralleled the Court's language
in BMI. See supra text accompanying note 308. Just as the exception to the per se
condemnation of horizontal price-fixing conspiracies was very narrow and
contextually specific in BMI, so is Kodak's clarification of when deterrence concerns
necessitate inference limitation.
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the upper end of the spectrum. As the Court explained, not only is
this vastly-more-often-procompetitive behavior not illegal, it is the
"very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." '338 The
"facially anticompetitive" behavior of higher service prices and
market foreclosure of that case simply did not qualify.339
FIGURE A (FACIAL PROCOMPETITIVENESS) 3 4 °
SI I I"
Kodak Kodak Monsanto Matsushita
(Dissent) (Sylvania)
"Always or Almost Always..
to Enhance Competition"
Facially Anticompetitive Facially Procompetitive
But even Kodak did not answer all the questions that Matsushita,
and the change that preceded it, unleashed on antitrust. Indeed,
Kodak arguably left some of the most important questions
unanswered, such as whether consumer welfare is the sole goal of the
antitrust laws, or whether some other values retain importance, and, if
the latter, whether those values important enough relative to
consumer welfare are such that efficiency considerations (including
deterrence concerns) should be subjugated in the case at hand.
Because Kodak chose not to grapple with these issues-that is, to
come to grips with the "redemptive" attributes of Monsanto,
Matsushita, and the rest of the consumer welfare narrative-the lower
courts have had to struggle with these issues themselves. The result
has been a split with courts relying on Matsushita if they believe it and
its deterrence concerns to have overwritten the rest of antitrust but
relying on Kodak if not.341
338. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 478 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587;
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984)).
339. Id.
340. Placement of the behavior is based on where I believe the Court would place
it. Matsushita is furthest right because cutting prices is the "essence" of competition.
Monsanto is just to the left because the vertical non-price restrictions permitted by
Sylvania are presumed to enhance distributional efficiencies. (I assume that the
Monsanto Court would estimate that enhancement to occur "almost always" because
of the inherent check of interbrand competition.) Justice Scalia's dissent in Kodak is
next to Monsanto, because he explicitly states that Sylvania's logic should apply to
Kodak. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 502 ("The same assumptions, in my opinion, should
govern our analysis of ties alleged to have been 'forced' solely through intrabrand
market power.") (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Kodak opinion itself is farthest left
because the majority views the observable behavior as facially anticompetitive.
341. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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In no sub-area of cases is this confusion more self-evident than in
conscious parallelism cases. Part III.D explains what Matsushita and
Kodak appear to require in those cases. Part IV discusses how and
why these requirements cohere with the notion that a case is
submissible when the sought inference is "reasonable."
D. The Interaction of the Conscious Parallelism Nomos and the
Consumer Welfare Narrative
The extent of inference limitation from circumstantial evidence at
the summary judgment stage in conscious parallelism cases depends
on the type of conspiracy being alleged. In situations involving
vertical relationships,342 the situation will likely be analogous to
Monsanto, where the observed behavior may well be procompetitive.
In these situations, deterrence concerns will necessitate inference
limitation. But, on the other hand, in the standard oligopoly parallel
pricing case, efficiency concerns (and the "consumer welfare
narrative") should have no effect on what evidence should suffice to
present a submissible case. As then-Judge Breyer noted,
supracompetitive343  parallel pricing is not desirable. 3" Thus,
deterrence concerns play no role (as Figure B indicates below). And,
specific factual situations aside, a conspiracy in these situations is not
theoretically implausible (unlike the predatory pricing scheme in
Matsushita). Therefore, in oligopoly parallel pricing cases, the
amount of inference limitation is exactly the same as it was prior to
Matsushita and Kodak.345
342. Today, people rarely consider vertical cases to raise issues of conscious
parallelism, but historically they have. See supra notes 261,274.
343. Pricing is supracompetitive when it is above the competitive level. This occurs
in oligopoly situations because, if the firms are able to predict their rivals' reaction,
they will jointly set the price at the monopolistic level and divvy up the profits.
344. Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988).
345. Cf In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Here,
like in Petruzzi's, plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy-an agreement among oligopolists
to fix prices at a supracompetitive level-makes perfect economic sense. In addition,
absent increases in marginal cost or demand, raising prices generally does not
approximate-and cannot be mistaken as-competitive conduct."). Although the
Third Circuit in In re Flat Glass pointed out "the absence of the Matsushita Court's
concerns," it was more circumspect about whether inferences should be limited
regardless, noting how "this Court and others have been cautious in accepting
inferences from circumstantial evidence in cases involving allegations of horizontal
price-fixing among oligopolists," id., but also how prominent commentators have
criticized these cases as resting "at least in part as 'an unfortunate misinterpretation'
of Matsushita." Id. at 359 n.9 (citing Hovenkamp, supra note 250, at 925).
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FIGURE B (FACIAL PROCOMPETITIVENESS)
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"Always or Almost Always.___1
to Enhance Competition"
Facially Anticompetitive Facially Procompetitive
That conclusion, of course, does not mean that any possible
evidence of conspiracy should suffice to present a submissible case.
There is the plus-factor requirement: evidence of consciously parallel
behavior must be supplemented with evidence of plus factors to get to
the jury.347 But what it does mean is that Matsushita did not somehow
bolster the plus-factor requirement relative to what it was beforehand.
Moreover, Matsushita certainly did not augment the requisite
persuasiveness of the circumstantial evidence needed to establish the
existence of a plus factor in the first place.
An objector might question such a conclusion given how the
Chicago School critiques played a considerable role in how the
conscious parallelism nomos, and the plus-factor requirement,
developed. The objection might go, if they served a previous role in
how the nomos developed, why not incorporate the extension of such
concerns in Monsanto, Matsushita, and Kodak back into the conscious
parallelism nomos?
The response to this objector is that incorporating deterrence
concerns in this manner would overapply those decisions. Prior to
those decisions, the conscious parallelism nomos had already reached
its own balance. Part of that balance was efficiency concerns, but
there were other, practical considerations as well, such as the non-
remediability of oligopoly parallel pricing (a Harvard view). To
blanketly apply Matsushita's "tends to exclude" standard without
recognizing that (1) there was a prior balance that (2) had already
incorporated the efficiency concerns to a degree is to ignore the
struggles that led to that nomos' creation and development and wreck
346. As Turner explains, oligopoly parallel pricing "fits with competitive norms"
and is consistent with rational profit-maximizing behavior as well as noncompetitive
outcomes. Turner, supra note 184, at 662-66; cf In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 444 (9th Cir. 1990)
("[I]nterdependent pricing may often produce economic consequences that are
comparable to those of classic cartels.").
347. See supra Part III.B (discussing the development of the plus-factor
requirement in conscious parallelism cases).
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the equilibrium that that nomos had achieved without any real
authority for doing so.
This damaged equilibrium, of course, is not the same problem that
Cover faced. In Bob Jones, the issue at hand was the imposition of
civil rights norms on a world whose existence denied those norms.
Here, at least in the conscious parallelism nomos, there is no such
contrast.
But I would like to suggest that to construe Cover's work as
reaching that situation only is an overly narrow reading of his
concerns, for very little of the struggle he describes seems to turn on
the presence of diametric opposites. Rather, I see Cover to be
concerned with the vanquishing of any group of people or set of
beliefs in the name of mainstream values without the decisive
normative battle needed to give such subjugation legitimate authority.
In that regard, his thesis and metaphors are equally implicated when a
mainstream concern destroys the equilibrium of one community of
beliefs unjustifiably, as I believe has arguably occurred in certain
conscious parallelism cases.
To be sure, calling an equilibrium "unauthorized" means only that
the process for reaching it has been deficient. It does not mean that
the new equilibrium is substantively worse. The new equilibrium may,
for various reasons, be more substantively desirable to many by
making the economy better off as a whole.
In Part V, I return to these issues in the context of oligopoly parallel
pricing cases in particular. The next part, however, details how and
why my understanding of the equilibrium set forth by Matsushita and
Kodak coheres with Kodak's statement that "Matsushita demands
only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to
reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely
articulated, in that decision.""
IV. THE THREE CONSIDERATIONS OF MATSUSHITA
In Part II.B, I stated that my reading of the case law, including
Matsushita and Kodak, indicates that a judge should limit the range of
permissible inferences at the summary judgment stage when:
(1) (Implausibility) the specific claim is factually implausible;
(2) (Deterrence) the observable business behavior under question
appears "always or almost always to enhance competition"; and
(3) (Substantive Law) the substantive antitrust law governing this
type of claim traditionally requires inferences to be limited.
348. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992).
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This part elaborates on each of these considerations by explaining
how they arise in the doctrine and how they affect the
"reasonableness" of an inference at the summary judgment stage.
A. Implausibility
1. Within the Doctrine
Implausibility concerns date back in the antitrust case law to at least
Cities Service.34 9 Matsushita clearly recognizes these concerns,350 as
does Kodak.35 1 They also arise in non-antitrust cases.3
52
The bigger confusion in the case law concerns the potential
difference between what may be called "factual implausibility" and
"theoretical implausibility." By factual implausibility, I mean an
inference that is implausible in light of the remaining facts at hand.
Cities Service is one example, as the parties in that case agreed that a
worldwide conspiracy existed and the only question was whether
Cities Service was part of that conspiracy; given the fact that Cities
Service's interests diverged from the rest of the conspirators, it was
factually implausible that Cities Service was part of the conspiracy.353
Theoretical implausibility is related to factual implausibility, but it
involves the additional inference that current economic theories are
valid. One way to think of the difference might be in "but for" terms.
Given the facts at hand the inference might be plausible "but for" the
current economic wisdom indicating that such inferences are not likely
to be true. Predatory pricing, as involved in Matsushita itself, is the
paradigmatic example. A major part of the Court's holding that the
inference of conspiracy was unreasonable concerned the Chicago
School scholarship indicating that predatory pricing conspiracies were
very unlikely to exist because of the difficulties of recouping lost
profits.354 "But for" this economic wisdom, the Court might have
considered the conspiracy plausible.355
Of course, if the current economic theories are valid, it follows that
a theoretically implausible inference will be factually implausible as
well. But validity is speculative at best. Indeed, that is a central
349. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., supra notes 129, 131 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
355. I base this conclusion on the abundance of evidence regarding cartelization in
Japan, among other reasons. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing how keiretsus control channels of distribution in
Japan as well as other ways the Japanese home market is sheltered from various
forms of competition). Note, however, that the inference of conspiracy still might not
be permitted due to deterrence concerns.
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premise of Kodak. In that case, the Court was reticent to conclude
that Kodak lacked market power in the service aftermarket simply
because it lacked market power in the equipment market to begin
with-a conclusion urged by contemporary economic theory on tying
arrangements 356 -preferring instead to look at "actual market
realities." '357 Hence, it seems safe to say that the doctrine supports
inference limitation when the inference is factually implausible, but
theoretical implausibility is on much more tenuous ground.
2. The Legitimacy of Its Consideration
The legitimacy of considering implausibility flows directly from
Rule 56's requirement that there be a "genuine issue as to any
material fact" before a case proceeds to trial3 58 because the factual
controversy is not genuine when the desired inference is implausible.
In this situation, summary procedures are used to prevent fact finders
from drawing an inference unlikely to be accurate in the case at hand.
An implausible inference thus is not "reasonable" because it is likely
to be wrong. I call this accuracy aspect of reasonableness "case-
internal reasonableness."
A tougher issue pertains to the legitimacy of a common variant of
the implausibility inquiry, that the plaintiff's allegation "makes
economic sense" before allowing submission to the fact finder.359
Economic theory is the baseline for whether a particular allegation
makes economic sense. The legitimacy of considering whether an
allegation "makes economic sense" at the summary judgment stage
therefore turns on the degree to which the applied economic theory is
accepted. When an economic proposition is universally accepted,
there is no harm in applying it; when it is radical, there is great harm;
in between, the determination is more difficult. All this is to say is
that economic theory, like any sort of theory, can play a role in
interpreting the facts of a given case, including determinations
whether a sought inference is likely to be accurate, but its utility in
356. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procustean Bed: Applying Antitrust
Law in Health Care, 71 Antitrust L.J. 857, 867-68 (2004) ("Despite misgivings about
its potential for misuse, some scholars interpret Kodak as representing a path-clearing
endorsement for departures from classical economic theory where empirical doubts
are raised about application of unvarnished Chicago School principles." (citation
omitted)); Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and
Refusal to Deal- Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L.J. 659 (2001).
357. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67
(1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). For an example of the
law review literature focusing on this issue, see Judson, supra note 127.
358. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
359. See, e.g., supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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such a role is limited by the apparent validity of the theory.' 60
Because theories are necessarily imperfect, so is the correlation
between allegations that make "economic sense" and those that make
actual sense, hence warranting, at the very least, added caution in
relying on theory as the basis for summary procedures.3 61
B. Deterrence
1. Within the Doctrine
As described in Part III, deterrence concerns are traceable to the
augmented consumer welfare concerns that were present in
Monsanto362 and Matsushita3 63 but not in Kodak.3" Although
deterrence concerns may be related to implausibility concerns,
365
deterrence concerns are relevant regardless of whether the sought
inference is implausible-hence Matsushita's admonition in footnote
twenty-one that the "tends to exclude" standard applies even when
the inference is plausible.366
2. The Legitimacy of Its Consideration
Unlike implausibility concerns, deterrence concerns have very little
to do with "case-internal reasonableness" and the accuracy of the
sought inference in the case at hand. Rather, their focus is on how
allowing the inference in the case at hand will affect future business
behavior more generally, particularly situations where the presence of
possible treble damage liability might cause a firm to refrain from
certain procompetitive behavior that would have benefited society as
a whole. This focus is more purposive: The antitrust laws are
360. This proposition is a central premise of Daubert's focus on relevance and
reliability in determining whether expert testimony should be admitted. See Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). But it must of course be
recognized that the Daubert standard, in particular the consideration of how well-
accepted a theory need be, is much more lenient than a comparable consideration in
the summary judgment context. Under Daubert, the issue is merely whether certain
testimony (and expert opinions) will aid the trier of fact and is therefore admissible.
By contrast, in the summary judgment context, the issue is whether that evidence is so
persuasive that resolution as a matter of law is warranted. Hence, situations may exist
where an economic theory is sufficiently disputed that expert testimony based on that
theory would be relevant and admissible under Daubert but summary judgment
would not be warranted.
361. See supra note 360.
362. See supra notes 86-89, 327-29 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 99-101, 332-34 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 112-13, 336-39 and accompanying text.
365. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593 (1986)
("[C]ourts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences
are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter procompetitive
conduct.").
366. Id. at 597 n.21 (citation omitted).
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designed, at least in large part, to promote economic competition;
deterrence concerns aid this purpose by limiting the realm of
submissible cases to those whose submission aids the competitiveness
of the economy as a whole. In that light, incorporating deterrence
concerns into the summary judgment determination is "case-external
reasonable" insofar as they help augment aggregate societal welfare.
Preventing deterrence, of course, is not the only aspect of
promoting economic competition. Stopping violations of the antitrust
laws, such as breaking up cartels, presumably will promote economic
competition too, at least as long as the laws are economically well-
founded. The issue therefore becomes finding a balance between
preventing procompetitive behavior from being deterred and
preventing violations from going unpunished, which the third sentence
in the following aforementioned passage from Kodak explicitly
recognizes:
We need not decide whether Kodak's behavior has any
procompetitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak's service and
parts policy is simply not one that appears always or almost always
to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal
presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In
this case, when we weigh the risk of deterring procompetitive
behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior
will go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.367
But this recognition only begins the legitimacy inquiry, for the
question is how is that balance to be constructed. The second
sentence above provides one attempted resolution: The "risk of
deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial" only
outweighs "the risk that illegal behavior will go unpunished" when the
observable business behavior "appears always or almost always to
enhance competition."3" Kodak, to be sure, does not unambiguously
endorse that approach-the language allows the construction that
observable business behavior that "appears always or almost always to
enhance competition" may simply be one example of when a legal
presumption is warranted in the absence of actual economic impact-
but it is probably the best reading of the two sentences together,
particularly the Court's use of the word "therefore. 3 69 Moreover,
such a reconciliation has several potential justifications. The first and
foremost reason is that inference limitation is a blunt tool. Allowing a
case to be submitted to the fact finder due to circumstantial evidence
does not necessitate that the fact finder will draw the sought inference
but merely permits it. Conversely, summary procedures deny fact
367. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992).
368. Id.
369. Id.
[Vol. 731698
2005] NOMOS AND NARRATIVE OF MATSUSHITA 1699
finders that opportunity, which is costly because they are presumed
the best at drawing the correct inferences (hence why we have
designated fact finders), and is particularly costly when a violation
goes unpunished. The gains to using summary procedures therefore
have to be high enough to justify those costs. It is arguably only
where the observable business behavior appears "always or almost
always to enhance competition" that those stakes are met.
But that explanation still does not explain fully why an "always or
almost always to enhance competition" threshold is better than
possible alternatives.7 0 Two other reasons help that task. The first is
coherence with other aspects of antitrust law, as an "always or almost
always"-oriented standard also applies elsewhere in antitrust cases
involving truncated analysis, namely, to whether per se liability
attaches to alleged "price-fixing" arrangements,371 "group boycotts,
372
and other types of agreements.373 The second is that an "appears
370. Daniel Collins, writing pre-Kodak, discusses how inferences should be limited
because of deterrence concerns when the defendant can
show.., that anyone engaging in the innocent conduct he asserts actually
took place would be highly likely to perform the very behavior that is the
basis of the plaintiff's inference .... He would thus be required to show, not
that innocence follows logically from this behavior, but rather that the
behavior follows causally from the innocence.
Collins, supra note 43, at 517. There are important differences between this "highly
likely to perform" standard and the "always or almost always to enhance
competition" standard that Kodak adopts, namely that Collins looks for how
frequently one will observe the behavior if one is acting legally, while the Kodak
standard looks for how frequently the observable behavior is procompetitive. This
difference has ramifications in situations such as oligopoly parallel pricing. See infra
Part V.
371. As the Court explained in BMI:
More generally, in characterizing this conduct under the per se
rule, our inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here
because it tends to show effect, the purpose of the practice are to
threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market
economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears to be one
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead
one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets
more, rather than less, competitive."
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (citations
and footnote omitted).
372. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289-290 (1985) ("The decision to apply the per se rule turns on 'whether the
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.., or instead one designed to 'increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive."" (citations
omitted)).
373. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-459 (1986) ("[W]e have been
slow.., to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business
relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately
obvious" (citation omitted)). The reasons militating against the use of summary
procedures are of course different from the reasons militating against the use of per se
liability rules. The former are primarily concerned with accurately determining
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always or almost always to enhance competition" threshold could also
serve as a fairly reliable indicator of implausibility, for if the behavior
appears to enhance competition today, that means that the
anticompetitive payoff to such behavior, if there is one, must be at
some point in the future. Potential uncertainties and difficulties
involved with recouping current lost profits heavily mitigate against
the prospect of such a long-term anticompetitive plan. Many allegedly
theoretically implausible conspiracies, such as predatory pricing, could
thus be disposed of on deterrence grounds even while admitting
imperfections in existing scholarship.
This balance will not be universally accepted. Chicago School
proponents that take more stock in conspiratorial impediments, such
as the omnipresent incentive to cheat secretly, will place greater value
in deterrence concerns and less value in the possibility that there are
conspiracies that exist to be punished, and therefore would favor a
balance less onerous to defendants.374 But, as I argued above,
although Chicago School theories were heavily influential in changing
the law in the late 1970s and 1980s through the "consumer welfare"
narrative,375 these theories did not completely triumph either with the
public or in the courts. The balance so described might be sub-
optimal, but it is the one that Matsushita and Kodak appear to create.
C. Substantive Law
1. Within the Doctrine
Substantive law concerns derive in main part from the pre-
Matsushita doctrine in each sub-area of antitrust law, such as the
conscious parallelism nomos. Except as modified by the implausibility
and deterrence concerns described above, they remain unaltered from
what they were prior to Matsushita and Kodak.
The qualifier "in main part" is necessary because Monsanto and
Matsushita arguably implicitly support certain aspects of substantive
doctrine, thus providing independent justification for their
consideration. Such is the case with the plus-factor requirement
within the conscious parallelism nomos. If, for instance, one considers
the establishment of a plus factor as evidence that "tends to exclude"
the possibility of independent conduct, one could interpret the "tends
whether an agreement exists, while the latter focuses on whether a particular business
arrangement is helpful to the economy. But, at heart, these reasons are similar in that
both are concerned with encouraging procompetitive business behavior.
374. These proponents might, for instance, favor a legal presumption based on
deterrence concerns whenever the observable business behavior "usually" enhances
competition.
375. See supra Part II.C (discussing the effect of the consumer welfare narrative).
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to exclude" standard in Monsanto and Matsushita as justifying the
plus-factor requirement in conscious parallelism cases.
2. The Legitimacy of Its Consideration
The legitimacy of these concerns is indigenous to each type of case
and is oriented in the reasons that led to their adoption. For
evidentiary limitations that existed prior to Monsanto, Matsushita, and
Kodak, such as the plus-factor requirement, their legitimacy is rooted
in whatever inspired the limitation to begin with and not in those
decisions."' In other words, their justifications existed prior to
Monsanto, Matsushita, and Kodak, and, except where inconsistent
with the implausibility and deterrence concerns described above, they
must stand or fall on their own force.
In sum, the doctrine answers many questions, but others persist.
The reason, in part, is because of the divergent ways in which different
individuals view the antitrust laws and optimal antitrust policy.
Subjective differences about which "inference[s] of conspiracy [are]
reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent
action" '377 will thus always remain.
But, it is the role of law to resolve, and thus transcend, such
differences-to, in Cover's terms, serve as "a bridge linking a concept
of a reality to an imagined alternative.""37 And, in my view, the law-
Matsushita, as clarified by Kodak-sets forth a clear analytic
approach, entailing three types of considerations: implausibility,
deterrence, and substantive law. The next part provides a specific
example of how my proposed reading of Matsushita would apply in an
oligopoly parallel pricing case, focusing on the Eleventh Circuit's
recent decision in Williamson Oil.379
V. OLIGOPOLY PARALLEL PRICING
Williamson Oil is, in many ways, representative of how modern
courts analyze oligopoly parallel pricing. The case involved a class
action among several hundred cigarette wholesalers who alleged that
the cigarette manufacturers conspired between 1993 and 2000 to fix
cigarette prices at unnaturally high levels, and that this collusion
resulted in wholesale list price overcharges of nearly $12 billion.3 80
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately decided that the plaintiffs had not set
forth sufficient evidence to present a submissible case, thus affirming
376. For the plus factor requirement, this is primarily the non-remediability
concern.
377. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
378. Cover, supra note 1, at 9.
379. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
380. Id. at 1291.
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the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the cigarette
manufacturers.38'
Although the result might be correct, some of its reasoning was
troubling. For instance, although the panel correctly recognized that
evidence of consciously parallel pricing needed to be supplemented
with evidence of plus factors to present a submissible case,382 it made
this supplemental burden too tough. By reading too much into the
"tends to exclude" standard of Matsushita and Monsanto, the panel
inappropriately raised the level of proof required to establish the
existence of a plus factor in the first place beyond what those cases
required.
Using my formulation of Matsushita's three considerations, only the
substantive law prong would apply to limit the range of permissible
inferences at the summary judgment stage on the facts as cited by the
Williamson Oil court. The alleged price-fixing conspiracy was not
factually implausible,383 and deterrence concerns did not apply as
381. Id.
382. See id. at 1301.
383. The alleged price-fixing conspiracy concerned wholesale prices after
November 1993. In the tobacco industry, there are both premium brands and
discount brands (and several variants). Prior to the early 1990s, there was intense
price competition among the discount brands, leading to an increased price gap
between the premium brands and the discount brands. See id. at 1291-92. This was to
the detriment of certain premium-intensive manufacturers. Id. On April 2, 1993,
Philip Morris-a premium-intensive manufacturer-starkly cut the retail price of
Marlboro cigarettes in a bold move known around the industry as "Marlboro Friday."
See id. at 1292. This move set off a price war among the tobacco companies in the
retail market, leading to decreased profits all around and drastically shifting market
shares. See id. In November, R.J. Reynolds Co. (an industry leader) increased the
wholesale price among its premium and discount brands, which was followed by all its
major competitors. See id. at 1293. This initial RJR-led price increase was followed by
eleven more parallel increases between May 4, 1995, and January 14, 2000. Id. at 1294.
The gap between premium and discount wholesale prices remained the same. See id.
Market shares also fluctuated less in this period than between 1991 and 1993. Id. at
1296. According to the wholesaler class, many of these lockstep increases were
contrary to the self-interest of non-premium intensive manufacturers except if they
were acting collusively, because they could have profited more through further
competition among discount brands. See id. at 1294. The class also pointed to several
instances in which some firms were in much stronger financial positions than others,
such as following the settlement of health care litigation with numerous state attorney
generals, but those firms chose not to exploit their relative strength and instead
copied others' behavior. See id. Additionally, the class pointed to several devices
allegedly used to facilitate collusion, such as: (1) the use of a "permanent allocation
scheme" to signal the initial price increase, (2) the use of "credit memos" that would
provide various manufacturers with time to match rivals' prices, and (3) the use of a
common consultant to exchange sales data by tracking shipments from manufacturers
to wholesalers and from the wholesalers to retailers and provide reports to all of them
regarding the shipments of its competitors. See id. at 1294-96. The tobacco companies
responded to these allegations by claiming that what occurred was mere oligopolistic
interdependence and consciously parallel wholesaler pricing. Id. at 1294-95. In
particular, they pointed to the fact that although wholesale competition was minimal
following 1993, retail competition was particularly intense. See id. at 1294, 1297. They
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supracompetitive pricing does not facially appear always or almost
always to enhance competition. Thus, under my understanding of
Matsushita, the only limitation on inferences are substantive law
ones-the plus-factor requirement.
But that realization, of course, does not end the inquiry, for the
plus-factor requirement has historically been susceptible to several
variations,384 and modern incantations of it are often intermixed with
discussions of Monsanto, Matsushita, and their concerns. It
consequently is very difficult to say exactly what the plus-factor
requirement is.
Nevertheless, I think three related guidelines can be discerned to
govern the application of the plus-factor requirement, at least in
horizontal supracompetitive price-fixing cases. The first guideline is
that its application today in these situations should be the same today
as it was before Matsushita. The second guideline is that although
there was a divergence among pre-Matsushita decisions about exactly
how persuasive the existence of a plus factor made a plaintiff's case,
there was no heightened standard by which a plus factor needed to be
established in the first place: The inference needed to establish the
existence of a plus factor, such as an action against self-interest, only
needed to be reasonable.385 The third guideline is that not all plus
factors are equal. Some, such as motive to conspire, are necessary for
the conspiratorial inference to be reasonable, but others, such as the
action versus self-interest plus factor, are sufficient.386 Together, I
also pointed to the fact that cigarette prices were lower during most of the period than
they were prior to Marlboro Friday and that market share fluctuated more than it had
prior to 1991. See id. at 1297. They claimed that these fluctuations alone were
evidence that no agreement existed. See id. Here, I express no opinion on the
substantive merits of the litigation except to say that, if the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the wholesalers, the existence of a conspiracy is not sufficiently
implausible to warrant inference limitation on that ground.
384. See supra Part III.B.
385. See supra Part III.B.2.c. The reason, I presume, is the longstanding belief that
it is the domain of the ultimate fact finder to choose which inference to draw among
the various reasonable inferences, especially where the motive and intent underlying
actions play leading roles. Cf Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)
(describing how the case should proceed to the fact finder unless conclusively
disproved by pretrial discovery).
386. See, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d
1028, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting). This is, of course, a
dissenting opinion, but I believe it is borne out by the history of the conscious
parallelism cases. Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all cases agree about
what constitutes a "sufficient" plus-factor. In the Third Circuit's recent opinion in In
re Flat Glass, for instance, it explicitly rejected the proposition that an action against
self-interest constituted a "sufficient" plus factor, arguing that actions against self-
interest arise from merely interdependent behavior as well. In re Flat Glass Antitrust
Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2004). Rather, the Flat Glass panel believed that
the most important evidence will generally be non-economic evidence "that
there was an actual, manifest agreement not to compete." That evidence
may involve "customary indications of traditional conspiracy," or "proof
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interpret these three guidelines to mean that to present a submissible
case a plaintiff needs only to set forth evidence that allows for a
reasonable inference that all the necessary plus factors exist and at
least one sufficient plus factor exists as well.38 7
Although the court in Williamson Oil abides by the third guideline,
it violated the first two. First, it augmented the plus-factor
requirement, explaining that, because of Matsushita and Monsanto, a
plaintiff had to demonstrate the "existence of one or more plus factors
that 'tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators
acted independently"' to present a submissible case (thus violating the
first guideline described above).388 Second, the court therefore
reasoned that, because of Monsanto and Matsushita, the inference that
a plus factor existed in the first place had to be more plausible than
the inference than it did not (thus violating the second guideline
described above). Consider, as an example, its description of the
action versus self-interest plus factor:
[W]e must exercise prudence in labeling a given action as being
contrary to the actor's economic interests, lest we be too quick to
second-guess well-intentioned business judgments of all kinds.
Accordingly, appellants must show more than that a particular
action did not ultimately work to a manufacturer's financial
advantage. Instead, in the terms employed by Matsushita, the action
must "tend[] to exclude the possibility of independent action."
Thus, if a benign explanation for the action is equally or more
plausible than a collusive explanation, the action cannot constitute a
plus factor. Equipoise is not enough to take the case to the jury.389
But this passage ignores the fact that unlike the predatory pricing
conspiracy in Matsushita, the implausibility and deterrence concerns
that led the Court to apply a heightened standard in that case is absent
in horizontal supracompetitive price-fixing conspiracies. Although
that the defendants got together and exchanged assurances of common
action or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no meetings,
conversations, or exchanged documents are shown."
Id. at 361 (citations omitted).
387. For how evidence may be ambiguous as to whether an act is against a firm's
self-interest, consider the situation where a rival follows an initial actor even though
that means less profits in the short run. As Areeda and Kaplow explain, this evidence
may or may not be against the rival's self-interest when firm behavior is
interdependent: "Although rivals might profit more in the short run by leaving the
initial actor to suffer the adverse consequences of unfollowed nonreversible action,
they might follow in order not to dissuade each other from initiating moves that
would increase industry profits when all do follow." Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow,
Antitrust Analysis 237(c) (5th ed. 1997). The dual plausibility would make evidence
of this plus factor a "tie" at the summary judgment stage. The case should go to the
jury because the firm's intent in following the initial actor determines whether the
conduct was in the firm's best interest or part of a conspiracy.
388. Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301.
389. Id. at 1310 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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there may be good reasons supporting such a heightened standard,
such as the non-remediability of oligopoly parallel pricing, it is wrong
to attribute that heightened standard to Matsushita instead of to those
reasons directly.39°
Of course, there remains the possibility that the balance of the
oligopoly parallel pricing nomos has changed since Kodak was
decided, and the result in Williamson Oil may cohere with that new
equilibrium. A central goal of this Article has been to describe the
evolutionary way in which precedents have been read as time has
progressed and knowledge and experience have been accumulated. It
thus may very well be the case that there are post-Kodak justifications
for reading Matsushita and Kodak differently from how they were
originally understood (such as widespread acquiescence to the take on
those cases in the Areeda treatise).39 ' The Third Circuit makes this
very point in the recent In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation decision.39
But that sort of argument is very different from the one made by
the Williamson Oil court, which feigned as if it were simply applying
well established law.3 93 Unfortunately, as this Article has attempted to
demonstrate, it can hardly be said that there is such "established" law,
much less that it compelled the approach that the Eleventh Circuit
used in Williamson Oil.394
390. See supra Part Ill.D; see also supra note 144 (describing how my reading of
Matsushita may well not be optimal because there may be certain normative or
practical reasons for over-reading Matsushita.)
391. Whether the balance of the nomos has changed since Kodak is an interesting
question that warrants further inquiry. Here, I simply note that cases such as
Williamson Oil and Blomkest, which granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant even in the face of evidence that was dually consistent with conspiratorial
and interdependent behavior (such as a five-day "market-correction program" by the
industry leader), see Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1050 (Gibson, J., dissenting), and the
continued predominance of the Areeda treatise, might support the existence of a
changed nomos. But other cases, such as In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust
Litigation, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002), cut the other way.
392. 385 F.3d 350, 358 (3rd Cir. 2004) (noting how "despite the absence of the
Matsushita Court's concerns, this Court and others have been cautious in accepting
inferences from circumstantial evidence in cases involving allegations of horizontal
price-fixing among oligopolists") (citing, among other cases, Williamson Oil); see also
id. at 360 (attributing this result to "a line of scholarship that started with Donald
Turner in 1962 and continued in large part in Phillip Areeda's influential antitrust
treatise").
393. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1302.
394. Gregory Werden makes a similar critique. Stating that "[t]he Eleventh Circuit
was right to affirm in the light of the plaintiffs' evidence," he found "some of the
reasoning [to be] troubling." Werden, supra note 215, at 758-59. But, instead of
focusing on the action against self-interest plus factor, as this Article does, he
concentrates on how the court improperly diminished the significance of information
exchanges that plausibly facilitated the monitoring of the conspiracy merely because
"there was also a 'plausible' innocent explanation." Id. at 759; cf. id. (noting how
"[the court appears to have held that evidence of pricing coordination facilitated by
communications is insufficient to withstand summary judgment because oligopolists
coordinate prices even without agreement").
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In sum, barring any shift in the balance of the conscious parallelism
nomos since Kodak was decided, the Williamson Oil court required
too much from the plaintiffs to present a submissible case. If the court
thought that the evidence of actions against self-interest really was
equipoise, a position that is belied by the remainder of its analysis on
the issue,391 the case should have proceeded to trial.
VI. COMPARISON TO POSNER
Around four years ago, Judge Richard Posner published a second
version of his eminent work, Antitrust Law. 3 9 6 It presents a refinement
of his earlier work in light of modern developments and is quite an
analytical achievement. No current work that does not attempt to
account for its arguments can dare be called complete.
Much of Posner's analysis focuses upon "price fixing and the
oligopoly problem." '397 Instead of the traditional agreement-oriented
approach, he presents an "economic approach" to the problem, using
seventeen economic indicators to identify which markets are
susceptible to collusion3 9 and fourteen other economic indicators to
determine whether collusive pricing exists in those markets.39 9 A case
is submissible when enough of both types of indicators are satisfied
such that the inference of express or tacit collusion is reasonable.4 °0
Posner argues that his approach "is consistent not only with the
language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act but also with the Supreme
395. See, e.g., Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1311 (discussing how firms' decision to
follow the price increase was in each firm's individual economic interests); id. at 1312
(describing how competition temporarily shifted from the wholesale to the retail
level); id. (explaining why it made economic sense for firms "to shift the focus away
from gaining market share for their discount brands and toward increasing
profitability by concentrating on, and increasing prices of, the premiums"); id.
(describing how there was large uncertainty by the industry leaders, Philip Morris and
RJ Reynolds, whether a price increase would be followed).
396. Posner, supra note 37.
397. Id. at 51-100.
398. The seventeen indicators to identify which markets are conducive to collusion
are: market concentrated on the selling side; no fringe of small sellers; inelastic
demand at competitive price; entry takes a long time; buying side of market
unconcentrated; standard product; nondurable product; principal firms sell at the
same level in the chain of distribution; price competition more important than other
forms of competition; high ratio fixed to variable costs; similar cost structures and
production processes; demand static or declining over time; prices can be changed
quickly; sealed bidding; market is local, cooperative practices; and the industry's
antitrust "record." Id. at 69-79.
399. The fourteen indicators to identify collusive pricing are: fixed relative market
shares; marketwide price discrimination; exchanges of price information; regional
price variations; identical bids; price, output, and capacity changes at the formation of
the cartel; industrywide resale price maintenance; declining market shares of leaders;
amplitude and fluctuation of price changes; demand elastic at the market price; level
and pattern of profits; market price inversely correlated with number of firms or
elasticity of demand; basing-point pricing; and exclusionary practices. Id. at 79-93.
400. Id. at 94, 99.
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Court's decisions, though it is certainly not compelled by them. ' 40 1 He
also laments the improper incorporation of the "tends to exclude"
standard from Monsanto and Matsushita in many price-fixing cases,
attributing the problem to various courts' tendencies to view
interdependent pricing as independent, rather than tacitly collusive,
behavior.4"
But Posner is harsh regarding the plus-factor requirement.
Although his economic approach incorporates many of what may be
called the necessary plus factors, he chides the search for actions
against self-interest, a sufficient plus factor, as nonsensical:
A similar ambiguity inheres in cases requiring the plaintiff to show
that the defendants were acting "contrary to their self-interest."
What the courts mean is that the defendants were behaving in a way
that was in their self-interest only if they were fixing prices. But the
formula invites the defendants to argue that they were not
competing because it was not in their self-interest to compete-
which hardly ought to be extenuating.40 3
At heart, I believe that his approach and my reading are deeply
consonant in that they only envision Matsushita as reaching part, but
not all, of the problem. His economic approach would influence (if
not guide) analysis under what I call the implausibility prong.
There are, however, three differences between my reading and his
approach worth noting; two with our readings of the case law and one
regarding why we believe some circuit courts are improperly
extending Monsanto and Matsushita. Our reading of the case law
differs in that Posner focuses only on the implausibility aspect of
analysis at the summary judgment stage whereas I believe that
deterrence and substantive law concerns also serve a role in the
401. Id. at 95.
402. As Judge Posner has stated:
The development of the law in this area has been handicapped by an
unfortunate dictum in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. that to
survive a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff in a price-fixing case
must present evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility of independent
action" by the defendants. It is unusual to require a plaintiff as part of his
burden of proof to prove a sweeping negative; but what makes the dictum
especially unfortunate is the ambiguity of the term "independent action."
Most courts mistakenly regard tacitly collusive behavior as independent and
therefore infer from the dictum in Monsanto that the plaintiff must negate
the possibility that supracompetitive pricing was achieved without explicit
agreement. This produces the paradox that the more conducive the
market's structure is to collusion without express communication, the
weaker the plaintiff's case.
Id. at 99-100 (footnotes omitted); cf. id. at 55 (criticizing the view that interdependent
pricing is a form of independent behavior and explaining that it really is a form of
tacitly collusive behavior).
403. Id. at 100 (footnote omitted).
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analysis.4 "4 The main reason for this difference, I believe, is simply
that our analyses have different purposes. Posner attempts to
describe the optimal summary judgment approach for price-fixing
cases that is consistent with Supreme Court precedent; I try to provide
the most accurate parsing of the cases giving due regard to their
history and context, which may or may not be normatively or
economically optimal.
The more important difference between Posner's reading and my
own involves explanation of why various circuit courts have
overapplied the "tends to exclude" standard derived from Monsanto
and Matsushita. In his view, the problem is simply that, following
Turner, many courts tend to view interdependent pricing among
oligopolists as independent behavior and thus not illegal without
further proof of conspiracy." 5 In my view, however, the problem is
deeper. I also believe that certain courts' analyses have gone astray
because of their improper incorporation of deterrence concerns in
situations where they do not apply, at least according to the language
in Kodak.
This difference is important because it is easy for courts and
commentators to note the longstanding Turner/Posner debate on
whether interdependent pricing should be construed as independent
(Turner) or collusive (Posner), and conclude that, because the courts
have sided with Turner on that underlying debate, there really is no
confusion concerning the appropriate summary judgment standard
today.4"6 Also affecting the current jurisprudential confusion is a very
significant debate on just what sorts of business behavior the antitrust
laws should seek to encourage and not deter.
Kodak suggests that only observable business behavior that appears
"always or almost always to enhance competition" deserves
protection against deterrence.4 °7  But, as described above, re-
examination of that proposition may be required in light of
subsequent economic and jurisprudential developments.4 8 Until
some sort of accord is reached on just what types of business behavior
should be facilitated by the antitrust laws, the case law will almost
certainly remain in disarray even if the Turner/Posner debate is
resolved.
404. Posner thus never discusses Kodak and its role limiting when deterrence
concerns apply at the summary judgment stage.
405. See Posner, supra note 37, at 94, 100.
406. Cf supra note 279 (describing how courts have been wary to follow Posner's
views, despite their significant acceptance by economists because the Turner view
"gained acceptance first").
407. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479
(1992).
408. See supra notes 391-92 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
A large amount of confusion surrounds the appropriate summary
judgment standard today. A common consequence, especially in
conspiracy cases, is that plaintiffs looking to Kodak's statement that
Matsushita "did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing
summary judgment in antitrust cases,"4 °9 feel blindsided when a court
holds that equipoise is insufficient for a case to proceed to trial; and
defendants, looking to Matsushita's plain language that "[t]o survive a
motion for summary judgment.., a plaintiff.., must present
evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged
conspirators acted independently,"'4 10 are upset when equipoise is
enough.
A large part of this confusion is due to oversimplification as to how
the current summary judgment standard developed and how it relates
to the traditional requirement that the sought inference must be
"reasonable" before a case can proceed to trial. As this Article has
attempted to explain, there is no simple explanation for either this
history or which inferences qualify as "reasonable," as the current
standard is a patchwork of competing considerations that have
originated at different times and for different reasons, and which are
viewed differently by different individuals. Far from being a constant
through time, the appropriate standard has been quite evolutionary,
changing as individuals' ways of interpreting current and historical
events have transformed through time as narratives have changed. It
still remains to be seen, for instance, just what effect the narrative
currently in vogue-the consumer welfare narrative-will have on
future summary judgment disputes.
It has been the goal of this Article to enrich the debate by breaking
through misperceptions of historical uniformity. But this step is only
the beginning in deciding what the summary judgment standard
should be, because history and precedent are only two elements of
propriety. Highly significant as well are practical considerations (such
as the potential non-remediability of oligopoly parallel pricing and the
lamentable existence of "nuisance value settlements") 411 and
theoretical considerations (such as the relative importance of
deterrence concerns in our antitrust regulatory regime and just what
409. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468.
410. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
411. See supra note 326 (discussing the Court's concern in several cases with how
lenient summary judgment standards might undesirably increase the "nuisance" value
of a lawsuit). See generally Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-
Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1849 (2004)
(discussing how mandatory summary judgment could be used to mitigate the
nuisance-value settlement problem). How the summary judgment standard affects
plaintiffs' ability to bring frivolous claims brought solely to extort nuisance value
settlements is a relevant factor when determining "case-external reasonableness."
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types of business behavior should not be deterred). To address these
issues, however, first principles of antitrust law need to be considered,
and while this Article has attempted to explain the history of how
such factors have been considered, it has not attempted to grapple
with them directly. Hopefully, with the history of the antitrust
summary judgment standard and the conscious parallelism cases
better understood, future efforts can shift to these more substantive
concerns.
Indeed, given the many years since the Court has last forayed into
the conscious parallelism nomos, it would be highly desirable if the
Court were to grant certiorari in another conscious parallelism case
soon. When it does so, the Court will have an opportunity to address
what Matsushita and Kodak stood for originally and reconsider these
historical understandings in light of subsequent developments. The
Court thus will have a moment for principled adjudication and
reconciliation similar to what the Court faced previously in Bob Jones,
where the Court can decide either to protect the balance of the past or
construct a new equilibrium for the future.
In Cover's eyes, the Court failed to grasp this responsibility in Bob
Jones." Only time will tell if the Court will fail to do so again.
412. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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